INTRODUCTION
Śrī Vedānta Desika, the greatest exponent of
the Viśstādvaita of Śrī Rāmānuja wrote the
Paramatabhanga in 1320A.D. at
Tiruvahindrapuram. It is the 31st
.rahasya among the thirty tow written by
him. It is a primer of the several darsanas
as well as an introduction to the study of
Viśstādvaita. It is written for the
followers of the system of Viśstādvaita as
well s for local consumption and as such is
written in a fluent manipravala (that
is a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil)
language. The work displays all the
qualities of dialectical skill and
encyclopedic learning for which he earned
the unique distinction of being called
Srvatantra-svatantra and
Kavitarkika-kesari.
This chapter as compared with the
Sarvadarsanasamgraha of Madhvacarya reveals
that on general principle there is agreement
about the tenets of the system under
consideration though in the details in
exposition there are slight additions and
subtractions. The difference in he approach
to the subject of expounding the systems is,
however, very clear. Śrī Vedānta Desika,
before he starts, wears his spectacles, so
to speak, of his system, and then, braces
himself to the task of expounding the other
systems and demolishing them with their own
arguments. His view is that self consistency
is not to be found in any system other than
his own. The inner defect of each system is
what he points out with ruthless logic. It
is thus that the Lokayata doctrine
happens to be criticized on the basis of its
own logical inconsistencies. The chapter
itself comprises of two parts, the
purvapaksa and the siddhānta of Viśstādvaita
in relation to this Cārvāka system.
In other words, the chapter, first states
the positions of the Cārvākas and then shows
the reactions of the Visistadvaitin to it.
No statement is left without answer so that
all the doubts that might arise in tile mind
of a cārvākan-minded Visistadvaitin might be
dispelled. Śrī Vedānta desika reveals his
acquaintance with the Sūtras of Vatsayana’s
Kamasastra as well s Kautilya’s
Arthasastra.
The
spirit of the materialist is wide-spread.
Man is first and foremost a material being.
The Epicurean theory in the west was
characterized by a certain amount of
scientific unrest and displeasure with
dogmatic belief The materialistic
explanations of the origin of the world s
exemplified by the explanations of the
origin of the world as exemplified by the
hylozoists in Greek Philosophy continued by
Epicurus and Lucretius have their parallels
in Indian thought. But both of them so far
as the scientific pursuit was concerned were
scotched by dogmatism and fundamentatlism.
The truth of the materialist cannot be
denied. Reality cannot cease to be
perceptual also. Matter has a reality and it
is perceptual, and that is why all idealism
must explain perception s real or at lest
phenomentally real (vyavaharika) and
not mere illusion or self-projection. Truth
must be experienced and the vision of the
materialist is that Reality must become a
vision, Brahman must become something
visible. The divya-darsana, the
seeing of God with purified eyes1
and hearing with purified ears is the ideal
of the scientifically-minded materialist.
That along with this high ideal there have
occurred degradations of this ideal goes
without saying. There is a fateful tendency
about all good intentions to gather round
them a number of parasitic unholy ones.
LOKAYATA SYSTEM
(VI CHAPTER OF THE PRAMATA-BHANGA)
Now we
shall proceed to state first the Lokayata
system, among the systems unsustainable by
logic, which deludes the full-witted and is
opposed to orthodox systems, and then refute
it (on its own grounds).
PURVAPAKSHA
1.
What they (the Lokayatas) say is:
Pratyaksa, perception, is the only
authority (for knowledge). It is a fact
conceded by all that even in these
perceptions, faults in the instruments
(karanas namely the sense-organs like the
eye etc.,) are sometimes referred to the
objects themselves.
2. In
inference etc., there is delusion that they
are independent means of knowledge, because
of their accidental relation. Even if some
of these (inferences and scriptural
knowledge etc.,) have authority (i.e.
truth), (they could be shown to derive htat
authoritativeness) from perception alone.
____________
1Cf Jaina conception of
Pratyaksa, nd intuition of Bergson.
3. The
mantras (magico-mystical chants) used to
cure poisons, nd other yantras
(instruments of the same kind as the
previous), are facts of perceptionon a par
with the medicines and sun-light and
moon-light influences on sunstones and
moon-stones; the lokayata doctrine accepts
(as we have said) only perception, and only
such authority of experiences which are
proved by it (i.e. Which are not
contradicted by facts of perception and are
substantiated by it).
4. It is
only by taking perception as authority of
right knowledge (pramana) that
Brhaspati has stated the following sūtras :
(i)
Ahta lokayatam: Now hten the
Lokayata doctrine.
(ii)
Prthvyatejovayuriti tattvam:
Earth, Water, Fire, Air are the elements.
(iii)
Tebhyahcaitanyam kinvadibhyah
madaśaktivat: From that (arises)
consciousness, like the intoxicating power
from the combination of ferments1.
1 Cf.
Sarvadarsanasamgrapha, trans. Cowell,
who quotes Colebrooke’s quotation of Sankara
on Lokayata.
“ The faculty of
thought results from the modification of the
aggregate elements, in like manner as sugr
with ferment and other ingredients becomes
an inebriating liquor, and as betel areca,
lime and extract
This
theory He (Brhaspati) got published through
Cārvāka (the sweet-tongued) and others.
5. Even
Akasa, either could be accepted as an
(original) element. Since with the help of
Pratyaksa htat is accepted by all
schools (of thought) as the menas towards
realization of ends of desired, after walth
etc., we are enabled to realize such other
ends lso as those belonging to ethical life,
theft and love and other sciences, which are
well-established in this world. As such they
are not subjects of dispute (being
self-evident to all).
Since we
cannot accept anything beyond this world on
the basis of our perceptive authority, and
therefore cannot refute our experiences on
te basis of such super-world experience (or
reports which we do not and cannot have), we
should live happily here (and now)(without
caring for the herefter and Heavens) even
like the cows and other animals which live
according to nature (and do not bother about
the morrow). The above couself of the Guru
(Deva-Guru Brhaspati) is most acceptable, if
only all the theorists would lay their hands
on their hearts(i.e. consult hteir real
wishes and desires), and therefore this able
doctrine is the most helpful to all
(parama-hitam).
_____________
catecchu chewed have an exhilarating
property not found in their substances
severally”.
6. It is an illusion to say that1
(i)
novel-like kavyas,
(ii)
the creation of castes,
(iii)
the performance of duties that are
said to belong to them which we neither see
nor understand
(iv)
the renunciation of present wealth
(for the sake of a speculative wealth in the
future,
(v)
the causing of suffering to the body
(through practices of Yoga),
(vi)
living by begging,
(vii)
shaving off hair completely or
wearing of braided hir and other
pain-causing duties, re capable of causing
(ultimate) happiness. Other systems which
subscribe to such (a strange and false)
doctrine are unacceptable to the intelligent
minded.
7. Those who are devoid of intelligence and
courage(of their convictions)—that being the
common nature of life in this world are
bring ledbyd eceitful means to follow
others. It is for you to act on the basis of
the principle “As is the king so shall the
people be?” “As all people (dress or)
behave, so shall you.” (In this consists
happiness).
8. It is only if a person considers that
there is soul different from the body,
breath, inner digestive fire, sense-organs
and other parts of the body nd the elements,
(and) that he is one who has to take up
other bodies (as results of his present and
past karma) and understanding rightly,
these, is he afraid of going to Narka na
dohter (dark spheres), there would be any
necessity for him to cease eto injure
others. (If you do not make such a
distinction and do not believe in karma and
rebirth and suffering in Naraka and other
places, there is no need t fear to injure
others.)
9. To leave the woman (you love and have),
to give up pansupari and bed-comforts etc.,
which cnstitute the actually enjoyable
heaven, and to seek instead the unseen
Heaven through fasting, saltless diet etc.,
means unnecessary (unconscionable)
suffering. (Obviously the bird in the hand
is worth two in the bush; cf. Vatsayana
Kamasūtra: I. Ii.29: varamadya
kapotassvo mayurat.)1
10. The body is the Self (atman) is (the
conclusion) arrived at through actual
perception, through such statements as ‘I am
stout’ ‘I am lean.’ Those who try to deny
this (Samanadhikaranya-identity)
would have to deny such perceptual facts as
‘fire is hot’ etc., (also). When we say ‘My
body’, it means that my soul is my body in
the same sense as the statement ‘the body of
the stone image’ (where the stone and the
image are identical materially)2
____________
1Sarvadarsanasamgraha,
Anganalinganadi yanyam sukham Purusarthah.
2 the
form of the stone htat is the image is
in no sense the equivalent of he matter
namely the stone itself, nor is it
equivalent ot the self which is withing
guiding and directing the body;
CONSCIOUSNESS IS A PRODUCT OF
UNCONSCIOUSNESS:
ASATKARYAVDA
11. If it
be asked whether there could ever be
consciousness in any unconscious substnce?
(the Cārvāka replies) that since there are
no substances other than earth, water, fire
and air, and sicne it is by their-
accidental (or chance) conjunction there
arises consciousness, as in the cases of:
i.
intoxicating power from fermenting
liquids,
ii.
the arising of poisonous power form
te combination of strange substances
(severally non-poisonous).
iii.
the medicinal results arising from
powers,
iv.
the red colour that results from the
combination of lime and turmeric.
v.
the appearance of hardness in the
snow-ball (which is merely made up of water,1
vi.
the appearance of hot and sweet
tastesa nd smells and touch (which are not
in those things?)
vii.
Pictures that cause delight,
viii.
the sharp-oints in thorns and their
curvedness,
Consciousness is due to the immanent power
within their natures, svabhava, from
which arise its evolutes viz. happiness
etc., their increase or decrease relative to
the attainment o what is desired such as the
destruction of what is hated, and due to
action nd withdrawal item action.
___________
1 This example is peculiar to Śrī
Vedānta Desika, not found in
Sarvadarsanasamgraha.
NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEE12.
Those, who do not accept the quality that is
called Consciousness, all the same affirm
that for the production of it, mere
conjunction of several instruments, (samagri)
within he body operate as auxiliary causes
to bring it about, just like the doll that
is mde to speak nd to perform (gestures).
This is like the opening and closing of the
lotus buds, expiration and inspiration of
breath in us or closing and opening of the
eye-lids which occur (in autonomous
actions).
13.
Because we see that a branch of a tree when
transplanted grows there, we cannot say
that there is another soul1
there.
14. To
those who hold that we get bodies such as
are caused by merit and demerit (papa-punya),
(we reply) it is impossible to say what
special causes, men, animals and trees
etc., have had in the past that marks out
their differences from one another.2
_____________
1 The phenomenon of a branch of a
tree (rose for example) which when
transplanted develops or sprouts out of its
own accord individually shows that the
theory of one soul pervading an entire tree
o rbeing is wrong. The bifurcation of souls
or existencesis a common phenomenon in cell
divison in biology. The same question about
souls will also arise there.
2 When we
speak of a cause, we should not speak of an
indefinite and unidentifiable or vague one.
It must always be a special cause,
well-defined, in the presence of which the
effect happens and in the absence of which
it does not. Anvaya-vyatireki.
15. Since
sorrow is not(seen to be) he result of sin,
to those thinkers who say that freedom
consists in getting rid of the causes of
sorrow, the giving-u o their bodies alone
will be freedom.
16. And
to those who hold supreme bliss alone to be
the mark of freedom (moksa), that which is
mentioned in the passage beginning with
“Thousand.”1 will be moksa.
17. The
self which is characterized by cognitive,
affective and conative activities, which is
(said to be) immortal, need not be accepted
by those theories which
i.
refute all differences between
substance and quality because of the
conflicts between sources of right
knowledge,
ii.
which accet the doctrine of momentary
existence of things, because of the
desctruction of things without any cause,
iii.
which deny cause-effect relation,
because of the inability to say anything as
to the nature of the inner potency (svabhava)
in any thing,
iv.
which oppose the externality of
things known because of the fact of their
being known,
v.
which hold htat because it is
impossible to know all, therefore all are
absolutely non-existent.1
_____________
1”Sahara bhga sandarsanam
moksam” sexual enjoyment with a thousand
womena lone is Liberty, bliss, is conquest.
Vatsayana I.ii.45. Indra is cursed to have
thousand bhagas. Sarvadarsanasamgraha:
Anganalinganadijanyam Sukham eva
Purusarthah.
18. Therefore they (carvākas) say that
casting aside all fear of right and wrong,
one must ass out of existence enjoying all
those perceptible enjoyments that come to
one unstriven for, nd those htat are striven
for by oneself, like plants and animals.
19. This theory was taught by Prajapti to
Virocana (Chandogya Upanisad
VIII.8.4), and he, in turn, taught this to
all his kin. So that this is called the
Upanisad of Asuras by the Vedas
themselves. Further this is the system fo
Brhaspati who is th paragon of intelligent
persons, having connections with the two
divisions (devas and asuras), who has been
accepted by those accepting the Vedas (as
authority).
20. Jabali also inwardly accepted this
Lokayata system and on one occasion preached
it. (Ramāyāna).
_______________
1 This
clearly shows that Buddhist view f
momentariness, the Yogacara view of
solipsism or the Alaya-vijñānā idealism, are
clearly close allies of Carvāka doctrine.
The criterion htat if some things are
wrongly perceived all are wrong is at the
bottom of this view. This criterion is at
the bottom of the Advaita view of reaity
itself which is htat because there re cases
of illusion, all reality is to be
stigmatized as illusion. This is the Carvāka
agreement with Advaita. Tehe development of
this concept of carvākas frm mere denial of
scriptural authority, from the subservience
of reason to authority to the statement of
perception as authority, from this to the
denial of cause-effect relation because
perception is momentary, from this the
transition to the idealistic position and
illusionism all comprising the several steps
of Materialism re clearly stated.
21. In
the Mahabharata,1 whilst
describing Kanva’s Asrama, it hs been
declred that the Lokayta doctrine is very
acceptable: as compared with other theories
that it is superior.
22. Those
persons who seek to tbe friendly only with
those who re continuously performing without
any conscience (anutapa) actions that
will ends opposed to righteousness, also
come under the (sway of this ) system.
23. Those
(alws) which re established by rules
(kings), by customfo the world, are to be
worshipped accordingly as Lords. There is no
need for any other special dress of acara
(such as exist for monks and other religious
sects).
24.
Therefore, since this system is in consonnce
with the authorities and reason also, and
since other systems accept this system, they
(Lokaytas) say that this is a very
important doctrine (which ought to be
accepted by all sensible people).2
________________________
1Cf.
Mahabharata, Śānti prvan (1410 ff)
mentions a Raksasa, Carvāksa by name, who
in the disguise o a Brahmin Sanyāsin spoke
materialist doctrines to Yudhisthira.
2 Lokayata
doctrine is rather fully dealt with in
vatsayana’s Kamasūtras. Śrī Vedānta
Desika seems to have derived the main
aspects of the later doctrine of the
Carvākas form it since he quote it also.
(Vatsayana Sūtras I.ii.18-30). Sarvadrsna
samgraha I, quotes instead of Chandogya,
the Brhadaranyaka II.iv.12 regarding
the destruction of the individual soul. It
also shows that Purusartha is Pleasure, sex
enjoyment mainly.
The
Nyāya Sūtras II.57 teach that Vedas re
self-contradictory and tautologous.
We now
proceed to refute this System:--
25. It
is impossible to accept the (carvāka) view
that perception is the only authority (for
right knowledge NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEEN
V. SHANTHA RAM, S/O. ŚRĪ V.
knowledge
through inference (anumana) and
scripture. Since such knowledge is not
characterized by doubt, nor vitiated by any
fault, and since their view that there is
non-existence of special reasons (section
14) (i.e. their view tht because some
inference are wrong all inferences are
wrong, and that there is special reason for
saying that some are true) involves them in
self-contradictions, and as such is
self-refuting,1 like perception,
even inference etc., must be granted to be
authorities for knowledge. If this be
accepted, even Pratyaksa cannot become an
authority (that is irrefutable).
________________________________________________________________
Śrī Vedānta Desika in so far as
he stresses the four fold characteristics of
Lokayta points out that other systems do owe
their inspirations to Carvkas doctrine.
i.
Denial of Veda is common to Buddhism,
Samkhya and Nyāya (earlier).
ii.
Pleasure as Summum Bonum is
exclusively its own; others preach absence
of misery s the goal.
iii.
The denial of a Self is common to
Buddhism, and as also to be doctrine of
momentariness.
iv.
The denial of inference is a
consequence of the doctrine of
momentariness, and as a consequence also the
denial of rebirth.
1 In this,
the Cārvākas refute themselves for a
further reason mentioned in
Sarvadarsanasamgraha trans. Cowell. P.3
hey accept in the case of pleasure,
pleasure which is never divorced from pain.
The universal condemnation through inference
is wrong. If it be said that in inference
and sastra, because we perceive some
defects, even in the rest, (there ought to
be defect) and that therefore the theory of
chance alone is true, then, on the same
ground this criticism is valid against
Pratyaksa too, (since not all perception is
free from defect or illusion).
To those
who hold that there re no other sources of
right knowledge than Pratyaksa, we reply
that they themselves infer that ‘if they
eat, their hunger would vanish’, and then,
proceed to take their food etc. Believing in
the words or a ‘friend’; which are not
perceptions nor inference for
themselves,1 wherefore do they
speed their wealth without any hesitation?
26.
Though in the Sciences of Magic, Medicine,
Sculpture, Astronomy and Omens which serve
practical ends wherein we arrive at no
(perceptive) knowledge on the principle of
agreement and difference (anvayavyatireki),
we find that for any skilful person they do
grant results. In the same manner, those
sciences which del with the transcendental
world, should not be distrusted (because
they are imperceptible).
27. We
advise those who have such doubts, a
according to the maxim “If the other world
were existent, to say that it is nonexistent
is to perish,” it is not right to violate
scriptural authority (on the mere basis of
it imperceptibility).
___________________
1 The criticism of Vedānta Desika
here I shrewd, as it points out that in
action Lokayata are disloyal to their own
tenets, even as they charge other systems of
being disloyal to their inward convictions.
(sec 5)
It I
necessary at this point to ponder over the
(following) vere.
“The Scripture I knowlable through
perception. In it the knowledge o human ends
(purusantha) aries. In it there is no caue
for any fault. Therefore, charma, adharma,
soul and self, and other mentioned in the
scriptures do not get repudiated by
Perception, not even in the Carvka Sytem.
Therefore O Ranganatha, just like Perception
the knowledge caused by the scriputes is
ture. Further, by the performance of Yoga,
He who ha attained very pure knowledge can
see the truths of the Vedānta verily a
direct Perception.”
Ri Rangarajastava II.5.
28. To
those (materialits) who hold that inference
and scripture could be subsumed under
perception for the reason that at the time
when there are no sense-organ there I no
generation of knowledge through remembrance
of (once-perceived) perceptions that become
their cause, and also because all normal
activitie o the senorium, Manas, are
only instrumental in that direction and,
therefore, depndent on the original
perception that has come to us
traditionally, (we reply) this view I not
correct ince ht truth revealed by these
(inference and tradition) authorities, are
absolutely necessary even for themselves (in
this argument).1
___________________
1The point is (i) the fact o
remembrance or remembering itelf might be a
fact of experience alone, yet to be able to
ay that the past I lke the present or
vice verse, is a fact of inference an
not one of direct
29. We
have already stated that in th mantras etc.,
that get rid of poison, the method of
agreement and difference (anvayavyatireki)
I inapplicable. Even the ethical doctrine
that holds the acquirement of wealth etc.,
as mean (to moksa) cannot aquiece in
the means that are against dharma, in time
other than that of danger, (i.e. it might
acquience in time of istres but not at other
times). As regards the ‘Science of
Thieving’ (steya-sastra), it says” Get
money from those who are wicked and bestow
it on thos who are good. Forcible plunder is
not foul in that cae.” Likewise, as in the
example of Śrī Tirumangai Alvar (Parakala),
it is applicable to Ksatriya in th
furtherance of righteouness (only).
30. In
the Science of Sex (Kama satra) which
exist for the sake of pleasing one’ own wife
it is said” Without any violation of
dharma, on hould seek love in the living
beings, O Bharatarsabha.” Since it is
helpful in the furtherance of innocent love,
since it is prohibited from being used with
respect to other women who have not seen at
least five men, and since it ii intended to
protect other women a alo one’s own women,
it is declared that it is not opposed to
dharma.
31. That
in all those matters which are not opposed
to the world, there I no need to enter into
controversy, is acceptable to all the
schools. (But on the basis of this view), if
it be pleaded that it (Lokayata) does not
concern itself with thing beyond human
experience, there can be no contradiction
with this school on the basis of such
(superhuman experience), then well might the
Madhyamika nihilist who has given up
everything, win in the argument.
___________________
Perception. (ii) Tradition or scripture and
dependence on it for knowledge reveal that o
far from impugning tradition the carvākas
accept it. (iii) Manas which I
imperceptible is the instrument of
activities of remembrance and recognitions
and of retention.
32. The
claim that it is a system whose truth appeal
to all is not true, since it is not in
consonance with the views of intelligent men
(nipuna Buddha). The Carvāka-theorist
himself is afraid a to how to live if the
imperceptible (world etc.,) were really
existent. Further becaue the difference
between , it would be wrong not to treat the
sastric injunctions that are in accord with
them as authoritative. It cannot be said
that there are no well established
differences between the classes which have
come down through ages from (almost)
beginningless time, without any kind of self
contradiction.
As said
in the following passages “In the
beginningless samsāra,” though in somethings
there happen certain distractions, there are
certain other things which do not get lost
at all from beginning less time (i.e. they
are permanent from the beginning) in the
samsāra; after the complete annihilation of
all, there I the creation established with
all the four caste etc., there is no less
of varna etc. ‘whose fault is not in the
caste? By disease who is not being troubled?
By whom I misery not got? Whose happiness is
eternal?” For these the meaning I that
knowing these, one should remain without
criticizing others.
33. A
kind of smell change the colour (or nature)
of milk etc. (into other products such
butter, butter-milk, cream). By such sign
revealed by perception, just like ghee,
Indranila stone etc., class differences,
brahminhood etc., caste-concept (jati) can
be perceived. Thu have our ancient declared,
(cf. Alavandar in Agamapramanya).
“Tama is
sudra, Rajas is ksatriya” a mentioned in
thee (passages), if it be contented that
jati (class-concept) is merely the
comparative (excess of defect)
differentiation (between the three qualities
or the body), it must be said that the fact
that what I unforgettably and universally
accepted a knowledge received from
beginningless time, as in the case of the
name of week day and their successive order1
is sufficient answer. With the exception or
man-class (manusyajati), if it be said that
with regard to other classes of beings below
it, there would b born mixed classes of
being of the same kind a anuloma and
pratiloma issues, there I nothing
repugnant in such reproductions of mixed
classes, since, as in the case of individual
belonging to horse-class, donkey-class,
bull-class dog-class by copulation with
other classes of being they do bring about
mixed breeds such a mule etc.
34.
Though the Vaidic (orthodox) path prescribes
many restriction on conduct, though they are
very difficult to follow, since they
have been handed
____________________
1 This I an entirely original
argument adduced to prove the utter
untenability of ht view that tradition is
valueless and fictional. A fiction that has
continued despite changes of date and
founding of era, in so far a week day are
followed all over wherever civilization
exists, is a fiction no longer.
down from father to
son in unbroken succession (continuity), it
cannot be said that they have been created
(by the unscrupulous) for the sake of
misleading the live of the ignorant and the
dull-witted and for the sake of deceiving
the entire world. The kind o the prescribed
by tradition (Sāmpradāya) owes its
origin to beginninglss Veda without any
break: to say that it makes one like a man
who ha his left and right hands tied up, is
not acceptable. (It is the way to liberation
and not bondage that the Veda through self
control governed by knowledge teaches, and
not merely that it I a sastra that owes no
allegiance to any human agency whatsoever).
35. Nor
is it correct to say that the body is the
Self (atman).
“ Since there are parts, the outer organs
that know the body as this also know the
body. The Self that has no parts that is to
be known as the I is not capable of being
known by the sense-organs, since it is
self-luminous. The ordinary man seeing the
close conjunction between the two (body and
self does not know their distinct nature.
Therefore O Ranganatha, the scriptures that
deal about the transcendent world teach that
which is different from the body.”
Śrī Rangarajastava,
II.4.
As
mentioned in the above verse, since the body
is:-
i.
composite of limbs, hand and feet
etc.
ii.
since it is made up of five
elements,
iii.
it is known a my body different
indeed from myself
iv.
and is the object of sense-organ such
as eyes etc., and since
NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEEy
sensations when there is no contact with
sense-organs, and (as against the nature of
the body) the atman is the knower having
(continuous) oneness of form which enjoys
throughout the body happiness (or misery
which is incapable of being known by the
outward sense-organ whilst capable of being
known directly by one who practice
samadhi (one-pointed concentration) when
the sense-organs are withdrawn utterly (from
outer objects), when one knows oneself to be
different from the body, (the view, that the
body I the atman gets refuted), and
vi.
since like the flame (that has been
re-lighted after having been extinguished)
is recognized as having been extinguished)
is recognized a identical with it previous
flame, those judgments such as ‘fire burns’
which are inferences arising from
dispensable antecedents could not be said to
be similar-to perceptions that are
antecedent and consequent relationships
(between the self and its body), the view
that the body is the atman gets refuted.
36. The example “The body of the
stone-image” is inadmissible to prove the
view that ‘this I my body’. IN the judgment
‘My Self’, the atman (or self) refers to the
nature of oneself (as a thinking being);
(therefore) the judgment “my house” cannot
stand as an example of any (other) contrary
meaning implied in the word ‘body’ (whose
nature is quite different form the nature of
the self jut as the house is).
37. The doctrine that by the combination of
the four elements, like the arising of
intoxicating power from the combination of
ganja etc., consciousness arises, is refuted
by the counter-questions whether this
consciousness arises out of each element
individually or in their combination2.
If it be said that (organs or)
________________
1 The principle of esse est
prcipi is refuted here. The criticism I
valid against all perceptual idealism such a
has been made classical be Yogacaras,
Madhyamika and Berkeley. Carvāka apparently
also held the theory of perception which is
identified with existence.
2Sarvarthasiddhi holds:-
This is a dialectic (vikalpa); the
answer must fall in one of this category. If
it be said that consciousness arises in
each element, then we should have
innumerable number of consciousnesses or
selves within our body, as the body is
composed of many parts. (A Leibnizean view
results). If on the other hand this
consciousness is said to be born through
the combination of all these parts or
elements, after such a production, if the
parts are separated once again, this quality
of consciousness should be present in eac
NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEEN
V. SHANTHA RAM, S/O. ŚRĪ V. VENKATESHWARLU
aged about 36 years, occupae
which is white and turmeric, which is yellow
are mixed, we get a new
parts of the body
severally are capable of cognizing, then the
body would become a city, within which
knowledge got by one (sense-organ) cannot be
taken up by another (sense-organ), and there
would (consequently) be no law of mutual
help between the members.1
39.
Therefore the view held by Vaisesik and
others, namely, that a new thing other than
the part is born, mean only that the new
thing I but a change of state of a causal
material substance, which I accepted by all,
and not that it is something unlike
anything determined by perception etc.,
which gets refuted on the strength of the
principles of anyathasiddhi (that is
essential antecedent in causation) and by
recognition (that what occurs later is born
out of the previous, however different its
nature might be, as in the case of the
change of mud into pot.)
ASATKARYAVEDA
40. Even
to those who accept the whole as produced,
there is no reason for qualities not in the
parts appearing in the self (the whole or
the avayavin). Intoxicating power,
poisoning power, redness occurring when
lime and turmeric are mixed, the hardness in
the snow ball, the peculiar forms and tastes
occurring in cooking etc., processes, these
examples are testified to by perception.
_________________
colour and a new product, in which each
portion has the new colour and new nature.
Here Śrī Desika speak about new qualities
emerging only in compounds, qualities which
make the original substances different in
every sense. The question that Desika asks
is: Is the body a mixture or a
compound? – an important chemical
question.
1 It would
seem that Desika visualized the grama
not s an organism but as a congregation of
mutually unaffecting member wherein the
knowledge of one need not coalesce with that
of other. Individual freedom entails
individual indifference to the rest of the
community.
42. If it be said that (consciousness) is
only the combination of the part and that
there is no such thing as self it would mean
that there I merely the combination of
whiteness and redness of the several part
and not any other peculiar colour (which
actually occurs when they re combined). For
this reason, it would follow that the body
is jut the putting together of hands and
legs etc., limbs. (which I non-sense)
43. If it be said that (this combination of
limbs etc.,) ha cognitive faculty then there
would follow the fallacy of dialectical
opposition (vikalpa) whether the self
arise individually in each limb or in their
combination? This mode of reasoning has been
followed by the sages in the past:- -
“This body is distinguished by
characteristic of manhood, head and limbs
etc.”
44. To
those who hold that the body is the atman,
and that ‘There I no other thing seen,
nothing remembered when the body is
abandoned, the tendencies do go off and
nothing lasts after this” –the refutation of
Udayana must be referred to.
REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT. CAUSE-EFFECT IS
NOT
ACCEPTED BY CARVAK
AS
45. If it
be said that there is no cause-effect
relation at all, then their statement: “from
them (elements) (arises) conciousness”
cannot be true. The example that the thorn
is sharp-pointed or curved would only
illustrate that for each object there are
peculiar causal condition, and not that it
is an example of non-existence or any cause
at all. There are cause suited to the
special nature of the effects.
INFINITE REGRESS IN CAUSALITY IS NOT
CONDEMNATORY
OF CAUSALITY A SUCH
(it should be remembered that it has been
maintained by the materialist that it I due
to their NOVEMBthorns are sharp-pointed
or curved etc.) For all effects that are
existent or non-existent (bhavabhava),
by taking into account only their peculiar
nature (svabhava), if we hold that
for each thing there must be a real cause,
then as in the case of blueness and other
qualities also, all should have (individual)
cause. If we refer this causality to the
nature of a thing (svabhava), then,
it should be capable o producing all effects
at all times. If, on the other has, it is
due to conditions (such a qualities and
situations), then, the question arises as to
whether it I the nature of the
quality (condition) or the quality or the
quality of that quality (condition) that
produces the effects. Thus there would occur
in the former case, the fault of too-wide
application, and in the latter case, of
infinite regress (anavastha). Te
cause-effect relation is thus
self-contradictory and non-existent.
Reasoning thus, they (Cārvākas) deny the
very nature of the cause-effect relation.
All such reasoning however, since they
themselves lack reason, become illogical,
since
(i)
there thing that have both beginning
and end should be either non-eternal r
non-existent when they have no determination
or cause for their origin or end:
(ii)
if between the individual particulars
only there is said tot be cause effect
relation, then there will happen the fault
of inapplicability of this (relationship) to
those other similar particular instance:
(iii)
if it be held that there is
cause-effect relation regarding one
particular thing, it would follow that
it is according to what we see (perceive).
(And therefore in all cases there I seen
this cause-effect relation, and it is not
chance that has demonstrated the particular
cause-effect relation. Therefore
cause-effect relation is universal).
(iv)
If the cause effect relation be not
accepted, (1) there would occur
contradictions to their own system which
declares ‘from them arise consciousness’
etc., (2) contradiction to their premises,
and (3) to their performing actions (on the
basis of such acceptances, however limited,
of the cause-effect relation.) And if they
seek to refute other systems and establish
their own view on the cause-effect
relation.) And if they seek to refute other
systems and establish their own system their
own view on the cause-effect relation as
non-existent, stands self-refuted.
46. As seen in the world, having agreed to
follow such conduct as is suited for the
sake of attaining those that are desirable
and avoiding those that are undesirable, for
the cārvākas to say that there I no
cause-effect relation, means that there will
be no place for reasoning (at all.) Between
the production of conciousness, and the
denial that there is any consciousness,
there I self-contradiction. If it be
contended that whilst the ingredients (samagri)
which are said to give rise to consciousness
remain without any light (prakasa),
how can they produce any consciousness at
all, in their product? (we reply) that us in
case o dream and waking conciousnes
knowledge arise at first without there being
any determination of it cause, as can be
discovered in our own recollections (smarana).
47. The doll’s talk, either through the
powers of gods, or of asuras or of other
souls through the pervasion of and through
the will of the Lord who is the being
indwelling and destining all actions
whatsoever, are product of (some)
conciousness which is their cause, since
they are created at all places (and times).
Also such examples as closing and opening of
the lotus-bud, and expiration and
inspiration of breath (are not autonomous
machine-processes and as such) are refuted.
The growth of the transplanted branch of a
tree at any particular place (ksetra)
occurs according to the individual
karma-deserts of the countless souls (Ksetrajñā)
who tenant these (trees). That there might
be many more trees than other (living beings
etc.) might be due to the large amount of
sin that individual have committed (thus
making them deserve to be born as plant
rather than as men). This fact, however,
cannot be a reason for the denial of the
soul-body relationship. Thus the individual
soul is proved to exist independent of the
body, but as enjoying the deserts of it
sinfulness and virtue, namely, misery and
happiness. Thu the theories that teach that
on the destruction of the body (no soul
exists), and that the enjoyment of pleasure
in the body is freedom, are refuted.
48. If it be said that if we accepted that
there are such fact, as vice and virtue,
there will be multiplicity of reason in the
instrument (ingredients) that severally are
determined (i) for the sake of realizing
those which have been desired and (ii) those
which have been coming to us through
heredity which are the special causes of our
pain and pleasures, then we refute this
view, since this is according to the views
established according to the eternal Veda,
in whose creation there are no
contradictions which are capable of being
mentioned. And there are no other faults.
ADRIHA AS INVISIBLE EFFECTUATION-PROCESS IS
ACCEPTABLE
49. If it
be said that in case we accept the principle
of adrsta (invisible potencies) (or rather
see the whole problem form that standpoint),
when there are visible ingredient,
there should not be invisible effect
(to which they give rise), (then we reply)
since such is seen to be the case in the
lives of Prahlada and Hanuman and others
belonging to their kind, as also in the case
of curses etc., it is acceptable to us also.
RELATION BETWEEN WORD ND MENING I DUE TO
REFERENCE OR ‘INTENTION’, AKANKSHA
50. In
perception, inference, ordinary information
and scriptural knowledge, there happen in
some sense the interrelation between word
and meaning. How can there be any linking
with meaning for words of the eternally
existing Veda, like the words of a man who
has dreamt, even though there is no fault at
all in the individual? (i.e. without
previous experience there call be no
relationship between the words in their own
nature there is a definite relation between
the words and the meaning that arise out of
them (more or less experienced or got
through samskara). By these words
definite knowledge is revealed by reference
(pointing out to an object akanksa),
connection (sandhi) and relevance
(yogyata). When this relationship between
word and meaning is not accepted, then there
will be no production of any knowledge
whatsoever, which have these word as causes.
And to the knowledge that has thus arisen,
since both the fault in the cause, and
(later) in the source of knowledge which
reveal that, are not existent there is no
objection in accepting their validity as
true a in the case of perceptive knowledge.
51.
Therefore, those schools which hold that in
creation as well as in dissolution, there
happen birth and death for the individuals,
will be similar to the heterodox systems of
Brahmadatta (Brhaspati). How can that soul
which is said to merge into the Divine
during Pralaya, everlasting, exist
undestroyed during the daily and occasional
creations and dissolutions? Therefore the
souls will be eternally established in
moksa in Oneness (identity). But
since the scriptural text which teach
difference between souls will contradict the
state of moksa decribed by this view, since
equality in the possession of attributes and
similarity will not accure, since to the
liberated soul free enjoyment etc,
activities are attributed, what is meant by
everlasting deluge I destruction of
ignorance, karma etc., and non-return
to birth and the complete
Brahman-experience (and not as Advaita
holds, loss of individual uniquenesses).
Therefore the doctrine which uphold that
Moksa mean annihilation of self is
equivalent to the Cārvāka doctrine.
52. The
view, which, on the basis of momentariness
of all things, refutes the difference
between quality and substance, also seeks to
refute the doctrine of qualified eternal
atman. Refutation of this view must be
sought in the chapter where we deal with
Buddhist doctrines.
53.
Therefore, having known the eternal Self
which is well-known through perception,
inference and scripture, one should seek to
attain that which will banish sorrow and
happiness that belong to the world of the
ordinary materialist,
54.
Prajapati and Brhaspati, the teacher of the
gods, when they taught the identity between
the soul and body, it was for the purpose
of deluding the Asuras. Jabali’s words which
owe their origination to the devotion to Śrī
Rama are answered by Śrī Rama’s own words.
55. In
the description of Asramas, to say
that the Lokayatas are the foremost
(violators) is to say that the Lokayata
system is fit to be criticized (given up).
Therefore it has absolutely no relationship
with Veda or Vedic thought (which they
glibly quote). That which is fit for those
who are like animals deeply tainted by sin,
cannot become the means to truth.
56. Like
those, who knowing that they would get
fruits by bring devoted to their worldly
masters (kings etc.), act on such knowledge
in the world, it is certainly no fault if
one asserts that by devotion to the All
Highest Lord proved by the world,
scripture, and common experience one could
gain fruits. Even to those who are devoted
to Perception alone, there is no possibility
of refuting this because the nature of the
Veda and the knowledge born out of such
knowledge of Veda are also facts of
perception. For this (Veda), the faults due
to genesis (cause) or illuding knowledge
(limiting adjuncts, upadhi) are
absent, and as such there is no possibility
o refuting it.
