1. We now proceed to
refute the Sautrantikan thinker who, having
seen that the Yogacarin who holds that outer
objects are non-existent, is an object of
ridicule of all persons, declares that there
are objects which are named outer objects (bahyartha),
but that these are not objects of perception
(pratyaksa), that only the
representations received form them are
apprehended in consciousness, and that
therefore the outer objects are inferred.
2. Even
where he has accepted the outer objects (as
objects of inference rather than as
perception) rejects the compounds
(constituted by the toms)
(avayavi-sanghatah) as non-things (avastu).
He treats the atoms (paramanu) as
without parts (niramsa), for fear of
infinite regress etc., (in finite
divisibility and other antinomies), which
assails objects possessing parts (savayava).
He declares that in the contact (samyoga)
between the atoms me do not have either
total contact (krtsna-samyoga) with
one another (in which case only one atom
will result), or contact at any one point (ekdesa),
but that it is due to vikalpa,
imaginative construction. He has said that
it is due only to some inherent
chracteristic within them (samyoga)
that there also arises the talk about
combination (samyukta-sambandha).
Since to the finite atoms, even as in the
case of pots, we have to affirm several
sides (parsvah), as when the sides
are not accepted as in the case of akasa,
space, all things will become illimited.
And, doubting that contact can only happen
when there are sides, for the sake of
overcoming these defects, he (Sautrantikan)
affirms that there is no ultimate quality as
infinitesimal-ness capable of being
predicated of the atoms. We see the
finiteness such as this-much-ness which is
the grouping of atoms (a grouping that is
itself a product of illusion (bhrama-siddha).
That is space (akasa). That too is
mere consiousness. That is not a substance.
In this manner, in the groupings (of atoms),
therefore the momentary infinitesimal atoms
which alone are of thee form of outer
objects are inferred.
(We
reply to the above contentions thus). To
him, who thus holds that between the atoms
there is only illusion of contact (samyoga-bhrama),
that there is illusion due to limitation in
the form of space, there is no other way
except to accept the perceptibility of the
groupings of the atoms (at least) which the
Vaibhasika speaks to, or to accept the
perceptibility of the permanent (things)
which others (like us) aver.
3. To the
consciousnesses which have objects of the
extremely distant past and future, it cannot
be said that there will occur the granting
of form (akara-samarpana), by the
causal objects. Even the example that is
utilized by him that, as in the case of the
inference drawn from the characteristics of
perceived objects s to the nature of other
(unperceived) objects, we can infer the
outer objects with the help of perceived
representations in consciousness, cannot be
availed of by one who declares that all
objects are inferred.
4. Nor is it admissible for any
one who instead of inferring that there is
such a things as real space from the
congnition of space (even as
representation), to try to shew that space
as such is chimerical (tucca). Where
is similarity of cognition (with respect of
pots and space) (pratiti-tulyam), if
one of them is reduced to non-existence with
the help of (fallacioud?) reasons? Then it
may be said even blueness etc., r
chimerical, having respect to what the
Madhyamikan has said. If he declares that
non-existence of obstructions (avaranabhava)
is space (aksa)1, for him there
is no way of including this (kind of
abhava, non-existence) under any one of
the (known) countings distinguished as
reciprocal non-existence (anyonyabhava)
and samsarga-bhava
NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEEN
V. SHAence.)
5. Nor is
there any possibility of applying the
attributes of nearness and fartherness etc.,
(in regard to objects) in the mid-space (madhykasa)
(if space itself is non-existence).
6. If it
be said that by constructing distances etc.
characterized by groupings in he substratum
of non-existence (alikantaralattile),
there arise the differences in imagining
these (distances etc.), (we reply)
only on the basis that if you grant that
space to be real, is it possible to affirm
these as delusive (spatial) differentiations
in that (space) by means of grouping of
qualities which are results of imaginations
that are equivalent to dram images) (svapna-jñānā-tulya).
In which case, the substrate (space) which
is clearly perceived etc., is strongly
acceptable to both parties. The author of
the Vedānta-Sūtras states this in the Sūtra
“And in the case of space also, on account
of there being no difference” (Akasecavisesat)
(II.ii.23).
_________
1”Points
of Controversy” Aung and Rhys Dvids
p.193. “That ‘what lies between’ any two
visible object, in the absence of other
visible objects is ‘space’. This is an act
of ideation, not of sense-cognition.”
7. To
this (school which seeks to affirm, the
causality of the outer objective manifold (artha-vaicitrya)
in respect of the (experienced) manifold in
consciousness (Jñānā-vaicitrya) there
is no way at all of grasping their
invariable concomitance (vyapti)
inheriting in the consciousness (about which
alone one knows). Having not apprehended
‘invariable concomitance’ (vyapti),
for him, there is no way by which outer
objects could be determined to exist, much
less is it possible for him to discover the
invariable concomitance in the outer
objects. If this invariable concomitance is
apprehended taking these manifold
differentiations in consciousness (i.e.,
representations) as causes, later on there
is no need to postulate in another
congnition (jñānā) on outer object as its
cause.
8. If is be asked by
him(Sautrantikan) who argues for the
existence of the inferred outer objects
thus: when the stream of blue cognitions is
going on, the eyes etc., and blueness and
yellowness remain as general
characteristics of he streams. When, later
on, the cognition of yellow happens (i.e.,
interferes with the blue stream) should
there not be an external object nearby
(which causes it)? If not so, will not the
blue-cognition-stream continue (its flow
without any interruption by other
cognitions)? (we reply) To one who
holds that when in dreams, the blu
NOVEMBER, 2004 BETWEEN
V. SHANTHA RAM, S/O. ŚRĪ V. VENKATESHWARLU
aged about 36 years, occupation Business.
Resident of 1-49/2/4, Scognition
streams alternate, there are no outer
objects but (these alterntions) are governed
by impressions (vasanas). There is no
other way except to affirm with the
Yogacarin that even in waking states, all (manifoldness)
of experiences come about due to peculiar
manifold characteristics of the impressions
(vasanas)1.
This
person (Sautrantikan) who replied to the
Yogacarin who repudiates the possibility of
‘grasping’ or apprehending any outer object,
in the following manner
“If it be asked how there can be
apprehension if it (the object) belongs to
a different time (from that of cognition),
it can be apprehended, declare the knowers
of reasons, only by being the cause able to
grant its form to consciousness.”
to say that at the
moment of contact with the sense-organs (indriya-samprayoga)
it is existent, (and) at the moment of
producing its cognition we (only) grant a
name to the outer object which grants its
own form to it, is also unancceptable,
(because) he accepts a form (akara)
of an outer object which is made to be
devoid of its own nature (svarupa)
(by being made to give up its form to
another, which is impossible as the akara
cannot exist apart from is substrate). Even
though we accept (such a form without a
substrate), it cannot enter into a
consciousness-that-is-going-to-come (i.e. in
the future) leaving, its own substrate (or
locus, svasraya)2. [It may
be replied that what is intended is like
die-stamping of the form].
_____________
1Representationalism
must end in solipsism: there is no other way
open to it.
2 A
floating idea is possible, but a regular
form abandoning its locus and awaiting
author locus, a phantom form, is
impossible or it is a ‘wandering double?’
9. Nor
Will the object itself remain till its own
effect, which is its cognition (i.e. of its
own form), comes into a existence, (since if
it did remain, it would be, firstly,
non-momentary, secondly, it might then be
said that it can give its form to its effect
in consciousness namely the representation).
When both these are without any object, to
say that there arises the modification
similar to it (in the consciousness) is also
untenable. If it is said that in the pure
consciousness there is reflection of the
object’s form, we reply that
according to laws of reflection as
determined by all people, there is needed
the existence of both the reflected and
the reflector at the same time (samakala).
10. For
these reasons, the examples of iron in fire,
black-ink in a pile of black beans,
Kadamba-bird amidst blue-lotuses, get
rejected1.
11. To
say that there is the same form (akara)
in both the prior and latter, object and its
cognition (respectively). Even like the
jati2 (class-concept) that is
accepted by others (especially Nyāya), is
contradictory to observation, proof and
one’s own tenets (upalambhopapatti-svasiddhānta-virodha).
12. The
view that like the red colour produced by
the combination of lime and turmeric, the
form (akara) which is neither in the
outer object nor in the cognitive
consciousness comes into being is also
refuted, since there can be no
__________
1cf.
Sarvrtha siddhi, p.451, which omits the
first example of iron in fire (taptayapinda).
2Jati s
abstract universal is not accepted
byBuddhism as real. Cf. Buddhist Logic,
Vol.II.p.184
connection between
those that are prior and those that are
later. (The example does not apply,
secondly, the object and its cognition must
belong to he same time samakala).
This being thus, there is no third way;
either we have to accept that the outer form
is an object of perception (not one
of inference only) or else we have to hold
that there being no outer objects, these
representation rise by the power of the (vasanas)
impressions (just as in the Yogacara school
of thought), (since we do not know the
nature of the grouping of atoms that produce
there representations of colour etc., in
consciousness).
13.
Further by such a person as this, since
momentary estable and enjoyable things
cannot be perceived but only inferred
as having existed, they cannot become
objects that could be utilized for eating
etc. To eat or chew the representation
(jñānā-akara) is impossible.
14. The
‘inferred’ characteristics even though
causative of fear do not exist the next
moment. (e.g., a serpent inferred to exist
outside does not exist even by the time it
is inferred since the serpent is momentary
thing).
15. If it
be said that they, being streams which are
enjoyable and which are fear-causing their
later moments are like their previous
moments, (we reply that ) all
consciousness-streams being unable to grasp
the wonderful diversity in the momentary
objects (vaicitryam), their doctrine
that diversity of cognitions happen due to
objective diversity will (also) fall to the
ground. This theory, since it makes the
perceived outer objects the ‘inferred,’
against all the observations of oneself and
of all persons, being a joke without any
consistency (transtari)1,
is extremely ridiculous. This system is
refuted by the author of the Sūtras in the
Sūtra “Nasatodsrtatvat” II.ii.25.
“Not from non-entity, this being not
observed.”
