THE THEORY OF BEING
OR
ONTOLOGY

The concept of substance or Being is to what the first chapter led. This concept is very important in Philosophy and has been dismissed often as a concept only to be renovated in newer guise. Substance in the ordinary empirical usage would mean anything which has sufficient persistence in individuality or integral being. According to philosophy, however, substance, giving its logical definition first, “is that which can only enter into a proposition as subject never as a predicate or relation.” A metaphysical definition is, “substance is that which is in itself, and is conceived by means of itself, that is the conception of which does not need to be formed from the conception of any other thing.” Between these two definitions, the former of Leibniz as modified by Bertrand Russell, the later of Spinoza, there is very little difference. Substance is the ultimate entity which is identical neither with its predicates nor relations, which is at the same time not devoid of these predicates and relations, both of which are real. The relations are as real as predicates. The latter definition, the definition of Spinoza, is professedly metaphysical and the concept of Substance is accordingly that of an ultimate Being which is the ground of the attributes and modes. Thus the ultimate relation between the substance and its attributes is a relation of an intrinsic (immanent?) nature. So much so, the attributes or modes inevitably lead to the concept of substance and the substance leads to the concept of substance and the substance leads to the concept of its modes. For, to be is to manifest to itself through its modes and attributes. They are intellectually distinguishable, that is by the intimate abstractionism inherent in all scientific thought, but not disjunctable by any means from existence.

The attempt at arriving at a substance without its attributes, because of the arbitrary dictum thus attributes lessen perfection,” that to determine were to limit and to circumscribe, that to define were to use expressions which are essentially an exaggeration of what we know of that which cannot even be known, is a preordained logical failure. Spinoza, however with his rationalistic bias tried to subsume the attributes under the grand General idea of Being, but when he had no sooner reached his goal, he could not stay there, as he could never derive the attributes and modes from the mere being. Thus God was, in the one case, condemned to be a mere aggregate of subsumed particulars or modes, or facts, grouped into two causal series, or else, in the other case, it was a mere existence neither a unity of concrete character nor identity of anything. As Rāmānuja points out “if Brhatva constitutes the logical genus, Brāhma becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Īśvara, sentient souls, and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (aśvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses and this contradicts all scriptural teaching (according to which Brāhma is the highest Concrete entity).”
But in Spinoza, as in Śaṅkara’s philosophy, “substance is reached by precisely that same process of dropping all limitation in the way of determinate qualities which gives us the Abstract. The consequence is that the derivation of less ultimate from more ultimate is beyond” their reach: in which case, the less ultimate must be treated either as mere phenomena though bene fundatum or veridical hallucinations or that they are real but impossible as far as logic goes or could envisage of derivation from a more ultimate being—a profession at once of the impossibility of knowledge. In the one case, Śaṅkara’s position results, in the other, an atomism most distended and chaotic. The former (Śaṅkara’s position) suffers more though more ‘logical’—if perchance to treat an entity as hallucinatory is the same thing as ‘deriving’ from reality. But to be fair, Spinoza (who resembles Bhâskhara more than Śaṅkara), “rejected the bait of the specious simplicity obtainable by denying the reality of matter or of mind or of God.” To him entities are real and not mere unrealities. The world is really a universe. “It is organically one, it is complete, everything real (divine or human etc.,) is it, or within it; and it is rational or orderly.”¹ The substance, Spinozistically conceived is either, a systematic organic universe, well-ordered, divinely governed, of whose many-sided attributes we know only two, viz., extension or material energy, and thought or mind-energy; or else it is a mere static being, a pseudo-universal, because non-concrete, undetermined and unknowable. In the former case, the substance or God is the mystical conception passionately achieved and exemplified a real concrete universal principle which is so integrally related to Nature and beings (the typification of material and mind-energies?), and in the latter, a barren entity that is ballasted from all actuality, as such an abstraction. But yet the philosophic concept of concrete substance, a unity at once real and universal, will not be achieved so long as the relation of substance to its attributes is not established. The tendency to monism is a real logical requirement of thought and the logical need and the psychological and religious groping at a concrete unitary concept of substance has converted a theoretical need into a metaphysical indispensability. What then is the Substance that will satisfy us?

There are three entities of which we have real knowledge.

A. Our own existence of which we are directly aware and intuitively certain; a proposition which all intuitionists justify. Not only that, while the laws of our thought persist, they compel us to admit that operari sequitar esse. It is the principle on which the possibility of consciousness and unity of knowledge depends. It is the soul which forms the fleeting series of impressions, thoughts into a continuous system of experience, thus making a continuous and connected consciousness possible. The Buddhistic denial of such an operari sequitar esse, and their affirmation of the fleeting

¹ Joue of Phil. Studies Vol.2 no. 5 pp.13
states as constituting the false idea of a self, is a self contradictory statement, for how can memory, recognition and recollection take place without an identical focus and self for which there is memory, recognition and recollection? (Śrī Bhāṣya I.i.1.) Further it is the one self-evident fact that we cannot get rid of by any amount of doubting as Des Cartes quite realised, and the Vādāntik assertion of the reality of the Ego (aham) or Atman is founded on this impossibility of getting rid of the self evident ‘Selfness, even whilst we can get rid of asmita (egoism).

B. The existence of God of which we are self-evidently certain if not intuitively, conceive it as we may, either in the Cartesian way as more intuitively certain than ourselves or even as Kant held that it might be legitimate as a ‘regulative idea, ‘ which we can no more disprove than we can prove, or else even as a logical requirement of thought as the ultimate ground or Substance.

C. The knowledge of the world or material things and objects through sensation which if they have not the certainty ourselves and God posses, is yet practically certain. It is on account of this category that all philosophy is divided into two primary groups of materialism and mentalism or else Monism and Pluralism of either type of Materialism or Idealism. Matter as the third entity can never be got rid of by any amount of intellectual subterfuge. It demands that it must be counted as an ultimate category. A real monism that is at once concrete, real and universal must be achieved between these three entities of which the second viz., God or the ultimate substance should hold the first and third in an intimate unity within itself suffusing each one of them with his presence. Our Conception of God must rule out every trend of Deism and affirm a substance that is the ground of all existence. Our God must be an immanent presence, rather then a far-off transcendence. The distinct and seemingly opposite categories of matter, which forms the world of Nature distinguishing itself as the mental and physical nature of individual selves, and Spiritual entities, finite in themselves, which operate in nature and for whom, in a sense this world exists, must seek an intimate relation in the way of modes or attributes of God, the ultimate religious moral and philosophic Being and Ideal. These three entities may be expressed to be the Enjoyer, the enjoyed (the World) and the Ultimate inspirer, (Bhoktha, bhogyam Perithārancha matyā).

The ultimate substance being thus intellectually conceived, the nature of Being as conceived by Śaṅkara shall be first considered, as it features such a large part in the tirade of Rāmānuja against false interpretations of the Vedanta-sutras, and also as it is for us philosophically important, standing as it does for a very pure Monism.

\[2\] The resemblance to lock is surely marked here.
For Advaita, the ultimate substance is consciousness, which alone is Truth, Intelligence and Eternal and One only, सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तम् ज्ञा which all mean the same thing. This Brāhmaṇ is mere experience or anubhūti, or Samvid. The primal substance is neither the individual nor the objects of cognition, but an all-embracing consciousness, which is never absent, for of its absent, for of its absence we can predicate nothing, nor of its non-existence can we speak with any sense of intelligibility, as it is consciousness alone that must make such a Judgement, which it cannot do if it was not. Samvid is thus One all-embracing consciousness which is the same throughout, whatever be its content, either illusions or objects or dreams or real knowledge itself. It is permanent, for by no means can it be held that it was not. Consciousness being thus impossible of disproof and since it is self-luminous (svayamprakāsa) we can never prove its non-existence (abhaya) which would involve self-contradiction. Anubhūti does not need a perceiver of the same because it could bend itself to survey itself. Further to be an object of cognition is to be a material entity (acetone). But if it is not an object, is it a subject? No; it is neither subject not object but a passive spectator. Indeed, we may say, that it is that absolute consciousness or experience where subject and object have no meaning; it is unrelationed and all relations between subject and object are unreal, and do not pertain to the ultimate substance. The objective world which manifests difference and relations between subjects and objects and between things and things, is generated by avidya (ignorance); as such not only things but subjects, who are intelligent selves, are all unreal as such having as their cause or condition obtaining an eternal avidya and Māya though the reality about them is Brahman who is conditioned by upadhis. Consciousness is un-originated as we have already seen it to be the permanent behind the fluctuating differences and changes and as being never absent. Difference or multiplicity, and qualities, which define in a way plurality and relations, it has none, because differences and qualities are due to an overlaying of Avidya on Brāhmaṇ and also such a statement of relations pertaining to Brāhmaṇ leads to infinite regress. The Sastras or Sabda speak only of an un-differenced (niravayava) Brāhmaṇ. What exists is pure Being, attributeless un-differenced consciousness. Śrī Śaṅkara’s view is that in the initial perception of a thing, a perception which is not adulterated by practical thought, or by thought which imposes its own ideas (samskārarūpa upādhis) on the thing sensed, is a presentation absolutely un-differenced; it is a mere ‘that’. This quiescent background in the presentation continuum, which later in Savikalpaka prathyākṣa, attains practical life and movement, is a mere ‘that’. It is the unchanging unqualified, indeterminate and passive Witness. This consciousness on which background—as we cannot in any of our experience get rid of consciousness and cannot prove its absence—is illuminated the fleeting perceptions, is the ultimate Substance. The realm of the objective is a huge categorical make-up. Thus to Śaṅkara, it would mean that the empirically real, which we shall call the Actual, is unreal though it is a manifestation or phenomenon of the noumenal and the real is never the actual; in the sense of only ideally present is it actual in any sense. In which
case, Truth or \( \bar{\text{Ei}} \bar{\text{E}} \) is ideal and real, the actual is unreal because it is actual. The close western parallel which Parmenides is, is further accentuated in latter times of the modern day in Immanuel Kant in whose philosophy we find the phenomenon-noumenon relation is mysterious but all the same present. Between Phenomenon and noumenon we can never point how one is originated from another, and as Kant himself confessed, regarding the causal relation we cannot affirm anything between noumenal and the whole realm or totality of Phenomena. We know that the Phenomena is an “a prior synthesis”. Śaṅkara, however, does not leave it at that. For him, it is due to an eternal ajñānam (darkness) overlaying itself on the shining and self-luminous background Brāhmaṇ, which is the passive intelligent spectator of the whole thing, the various apparent manifold creation of objects and things and egos arise\(^3\). The clouding or overlaying is due to Māya, a mysterious power, not describable as real or as unreal. The real is thus experience which is not ‘involved’ in the unreal manifold, yet ‘really’ appearing as manifold. That Absolute Experience, which is known only by those who give up this multiplicity, is best described as true (satyam), meaning by that not-false, jñānam because it is not ignorance and matter, Anantham (eternal) meaning by that not-perishing and timeless. All positive prediction it refutes, because every qualification means reduction of quality, and reduction of it to the level of the definite and the differenced. This unknowable, however speciously concealed under the name of the attainable, transcends all limiting categories of Thought; but does not such a being thus standing undefined, equally give itself to non-being because we never come across such an entity and cannot speak about it? Does not such an attitude perilously descend to Šūnya-vāda against which Śrī Śaṅkara so ably lifted his banner of revolt?

Rāmānuja refutes this conception of substance of Advaita, categorically in his Mahā Siddhanta of Śrī Bhāṣya. The theory of Consciousness as Substance is a very faulty conception, because the subject of experience is not consciousness but a conscious subject—a subject who possesses consciousness as an instrument of functioning in the act of cognising or knowing.

2. Consciousness is not that which subsists in all states (avasthas), for consciousness is an activity of the knower or subject and is set in action only when the subject requires it, i.e., when the subject engages itself with an object or reacts to stimuli.

3. Consciousness is not eternal, because consciousness, as stated in the previous objection, is an interim activity and by no means absolutely required throughout

\(^3\) Cf. Chapter II.
existence. (Of course the modern psychologists hold consciousness to be a stream, but it no more explains the specific function of consciousness as a cognitive act always). It is only when he functions, consciousness is present. “As this quality is not however essential but originated by action, the self is essentially unchanging” (I. I. 1 pp63). And consciousness itself is evidence of its nonpresence (abhava), as when we speak ‘I am conscious’, ‘I was awake’ or ‘I was asleep’. Further consciousness is a knowledge-activity of the Subject and makes the object present to its subject. Consciousness is active only in the compresence of subject and object and is not manifest otherwise, though by no means absent as a potential function or quality of the subject. The quality of being a knowing-subject (not of being conscious) is not absolutely essential (tachca na svabhavika) to the individual ego (jīva); it is that, whenever it engages itself with an object, as such whenever this kshetrajna-condition i.e., of being a knower, takes place, consciousness manifests itself as a projection of action, just as the shining rays of light or brilliance proceeds from lamps, Sun, and gems दीपस्वर्यंप्रकाशाःस्वाभावस्वर्यं प्रकाशते.

In its passivity, there is no particular action not even of cognition, no engagement with any particular object or objects; it is a dull awareness. So much so, this dull awareness of the non-cognitive period in the action of cognising (whose sphere is unlimited per se) due to this particular engagement with a particular object, becomes focussed and fused with its immediate presentation or sensum. Or in other words, “owing to this influence of Karman (work) it becomes of a contracted nature as it more or less adopts itself to work of different kinds and is variously determined by different senses.” (I. li. 1.) क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां कर्मणा संकुचितस्वरूपं तत्तक्षेत्रानुगमनन्तरात्मित्वमेव वर्तने !

तद्विद्यावर्तने ! तत्त्त्वमित्रियां ज्ञानप्रकृतिनियोग्यद्यात्मित्वमेव वर्तने ! प्रवर्तते! एवमात्मा विद्वृत्तां चैत्यवृहण इति! विद्वृत्ततां हि स्वयंप्रकाशस्त।

But the subjects as knower, must be an intelligent entity, as consciousness is possible only to an intelligence (chetana). In other words, Consciousness as an attribute or quality of a conscious subject, is quite different from the subject whose nature is conscientness or intelligence. एवमात्माचिद्वृत्तां चैत्यवृहण हि खलु हि स्वयंप्रकाशस्त।

Because intelligence is seen in every presence of consciousness, the latter being the quality of the intelligent subject, it is false to assert that consciousness is the substance and that intelligence is its nature. Nor could it be said that because of the sameness of consciousness in every individual, the individuals are foci somehow concreted by matter (ahankāra?). The sphere of knowing of a conscient subject when not limited or contracted by samskaras or actions, is the whole of reality. But as we are so determined and the possibility of that total experience is attained only when we leave the centralised point and achieve or rather fulfil the world-actions with the consciousness of the perfect. The unbiased decentralised or acentric vision does not distort reality and its meaning like a lens not corrected for spherical and chromatic
aberration, thus projecting distorted and coloured image but gives the perfect vision or representation of the whole.

4. That the eternal stretch of consciousness (anubhūti) should be capable of being deflected by different ignorants (avidhyās) to give rise to the individual existences and egos is inconceivable. For consciousness, conceding to it an eternal stretch of same intensity over every object, would appear to be defined objects of various types just as the spectral colours, when thrown upon similar objects or identical things, reveal multi-coloured and different things with various names, but it certainly could not account for the persistence of the egos though it would give rise to the particularisations of tensions and toes. It would, in the best interpretation, reveal fleeting existences rather than permanent objects. The reason given by Advaita for the inference of different infinite ignorants (avidhyās) whose very existence is dependent upon the presence of the egos, and is an inference drawn by their presence, and also that their (egos) presence as the resultant of the deflexion or splitting of the one-Consciousness into foci of different tensions and colours by avidhyās which are final entities (sanatanah and anadi), is indeed a specious and spurious circular reasoning.

5. Consciousness cannot claim the status an intelligent existence, though it is an activity of an intelligent subject, as such might rightly be called unintelligent (acēthana), in the sense that, whatever is not-intelligent is unintelligent. It is capable of manifesting objects to its substrate but it cannot reveal itself to itself for we know of a subject becoming self-conscious or self-luminous (chidrupa hi svayamprakāśata), but never of consciousness (chaitanya) becoming self-conscious or having self-consciousness (prathyakta)⁴. It is on the objects however, that we find this consciousness displayed and not usually in the subjects and it is this fact that makes all solipsists and subjective idealists affirm that all objects are the product of the consciousness. However, Consciousness is an indispensable function⁵ of the intelligent subject forms its ground or substance, as such constitutes in a sense, its essential nature or invariable appendage (aprathaksiddha ralation) and an indispensable expression and function, a function terminable, contractable or expandable at the will of the subject in and by his capacity of function. The only necessity for consciousness is the presence of this relation(object) and function. Consciousness, infinite in scope, can be cut off, or screened according to the limitation of natural upādhis or karma; of nature, due to its evolution, (ādibhautika); of

⁴ Śrī Bhāṣya. I. I. 1. “Of this consciousness…it would be difficult to prove that at the same time it is itself agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is an action.”

⁵ Wm. James on “Does Consciousness exist” says, “I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function
karma, due to activities (adhyaṭmika); both of which are mutually dependent because the body assumed by the ego is according to its prior-habits or habits and complexes formed in a prior life.

The first cause, it has been said, cannot be anything other than a world-intelligence or Spirit, in so far as we recognise order and harmony amidst the warring elements of nature. The final substance or Being is also intelligence or Spirit, which sustains nature and makes it what it is. This Intelligence is independent of every and any other existence in so far and only in so far as it is no controlled or sustained by any other entity. It is svatantra; it is that which forms the ultimate ground of all existence. There cannot be any other ruler. He alone is the sole ruler. (I. i. 1.). The ultimate self is not a pure un-differenced non-personal consciousness; nor is the individual self or subject of all experience a vanishing focus of consciousness. The self, we have defined, to be intelligent by nature (Svarūpa) and intelligent in functioning (in its viśeṣana), for to act or to be capable of intelligent activity, is a quality or attribute of all intelligent actor or agent (kartha). Action as already pointed out, no more than the rays of light is the source of light, is actor or even witness (sākhṣin).

It is held that beyond the mere subject and mere object there must be a category which holds these in a synthesis, out of which can issue by some un-definable mysterious means, (say, Māya- Śakti or avidya) these two entities). They seek once more by intellectual means, to synthesize all these differences in order to form a real non-dual (not unity). Being into which, in reality, these are dissolved and obliterated. Such a method can never yield a true conception of the real. For one could understand the need for such a triadic synthesis, if the two, subject and object, are really opposites which need to be held in a unity which is different from both of them. Even accepting that this ultimate category should be an eternal stretch of mere consciousness, calling it the ultimate substance, is certainly asking too much of what is really a function or entity.6 At this rate of synthesising, we would be thrown upon an absolute, absolutely unknowable, an entity which would be neither spirit nor matter, neither subject nor object, non-subject and non-object, not Being and non-Not-Being. What it is, can never be said or thought. But such an unknowable, despite what its supporters may claim for it, as the culmination of thought and feeling in a real Mystical. Being, is atleast not enable logically.

Spirit and matter, subject and object are no opposites but distincts and the further term emerging in the one case, would be Activity and Consciousness, in the other;

6. “Function is an entity, because it is something that can be thought about. It is a category not a substance “ Dr. A.N. Whitehead says by lifting the sting from the word “entity” as applied to consciousness, which as Wm. James said is not entity by which he meant the substance which Absolutism and subjectivism asserted.
activity, when spirit rule, controls, and sustains matter and fashions it to its ends; consciousness, when the subject is in comprence with its objects or object. It is not true to assert that to be an object of consciousness or rather a conscious subject is to be unintelligent per se. For the intimate capacity of a subject is to be conscious of itself, in which case, it would be itself unintelligent according to such a dictum, which certainly is absurd. Rāmanāja says that you should not define that as ‘being of the nature that light is present without exceptions’. It is true that the conscious self which stands in the particular determinate relation of object to another conscious self, may be passive to its subject at that moment, but it cannot even be legitimately claimed, that that other self is not treating the knowing-consciousness as its object at that moment. Thus whatever stands in an objective relation is an object and that need not be necessarily non-intelligent per se , and that it is intelligent in at least one case, will be showed presently.

The inability to dent objective relations to the Spirit or intelligence must force us to assume a different postulate. The relation of Subject-object, and spirit-matter, anyhow subsists and ought to subsist even with regard to the ultimate Being as far as logic goes. To deny this, were to accept in some way or other the defeat of thought in its pursuit to know truth. Out of this impasse can we not seek a path out, if we assert that though there is a difference of nature between matter and spirit, object and subject, they are held in unity by one of the terms? And further, is it not quite apparent that once we grant that, the superior in nature or character between them must naturally therefore be called the sustainer in the relation? The object is not object until and unless it is sustained and enjoyed by its subject. The functional importance of the subject (which is intelligence always) in the relation ought to be recognised, as much as the functional importance of the superiority of intelligence or spirit over matter. They cannot destroy each other, but they are bound to unity and this unity is achieved by the superior between them assuming control and direction

7. “Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness, of a relation between these two,... Every fact in reality with which I am acquainted is not merely a fact, it is also owing to relation of ‘having in consciousness’ a content of consciousness, in other words, the Ego exercises towards it the function of becoming conscious”. N. Lossky’s article in the Ency. Of Phil. Sciences on the “Transformation of the concept of consciousness in Modern epistemology and its bearing on Logic.”

8. Śrī Bhāṣya. l. i. 1. (61 pp. trns).
We do not apprehend other centres or selves as unconscious.
“Mere being i.e. Brahman, would hold the position of an objet with regard to the instruments of knowledge, and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself (Sanakara) non-intelligence, perishableness and so on” l. i. 1.

The general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is, in fact, untenable.
over the lower, using it for purposes which it alone knows. Matter has no ends\(^9\) to save for itself and can have no ends as it is unintelligent; it is fashioned towards ends by the spirit which holds it captive and pervades it as its self\(^{10}\).

In knowledge-relation, the subject because of the character of knowing, is superior to its object, and the object as the object of the knower, is sustained by the relation and made one with its subject, a unity or relation at once integral; and consciousness is the incident activity which is the expression of the nature of intelligence it is.

The three entities (tattvas)(By entity meaning whatever can be thought about, as Dr. Whitehead remarks) are involved in knowing, namely, the knowing subject, the known object, and the act or function of becoming conscious, which function brings about the relation of unity between the two terms. To stress the knowing act or function, because it appears to be the back-ground on which the subject and object seem to be differenced, more than the knower and the known, as if these are the secondary inflexions of it and within it, were to assumed too much from the date we have in actuality. Indeed, it seems to be a perversion of this fact.

In the first place, Brâhmaṇ is the ultimate inner self, antaryami of ‘all beings,’\(^{11}\) holding both nature and finite selves in an absolutely dependent relation or rather effect-relation (cf. 1st. Chapter). As the ultimate inner self, Brâhmaṇ is the ultimate knower of everything, because he is the ultimate intelligence pervading everything, act and function, destining them to the ultimate goal of perfection. Unexhausted by any, being over and above each and every existence, He is the transcendent and immanent ground of their being what they are. He is the concrete universal, the real Absolute. He is the ultimate subject or knower, which does not mean the unqualified non-personal Śākṣi chaitanyam, but an infinitely intelligent personality. If on the other hand the essential nature of first Brâhmaṇ itself constituted the running subject, your mind really coincides with the one field by us”. Brâhmaṇ is not jñānam but jñānī.

The secondary subject is the individual subject, the finite knower; and it is only when the knowledge of the ultimate substance (Brâhmaṇ) and that of the individual

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\(^9\)But Sankhya holds that the purpose of Pradhana is first infinite and then to explicate the person from the process of involving that the entire philosophy could also understood in its primitive bearing as a near cousin of Vedanta where lila is explained rather than in the later sutras of the Sâmkhya karika.

\(^{10}\)Śrī Bhâṣya I. i. 1. (pp. 92) “The world is HE”. The identity expressed by this clause is founded on the fact that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the world as its self in the character of inward rulers; and is not founded on the unity of substance of the pervading principale and the world pervaded.”

\(^{11}\) Antaryami Brâhmaṇa (Brih. Ujp.)
knower agree and are not variant, the individual’s knowledge is perfect and whole with regard to an object. If however, the individual knowledge is different from that of Brāhmaṇ (a fact of comparison that in the very nature of things, perhaps, impossible) which however, is very easily seen in the practical ineffectuality in and for life, the individual knowing is vitiated by egoistic and pragmatic considerations and becomes erroneous. The effort to which the finite selves are bound to by the dissatisfaction which the present knowledge gives them, is enough to show that their knowledge is wanting in that self-appreciation or self-evidence characteristic of reality’s own appreciation. In fact, reality seeks this characteristic achievement through the finite selves or centres moving towards the divine consummation of perfection which is the potential characteristic of itself and the actual character of the Deity.

Between the primary Kṣetrajñavajña and the secondary subject just to use the expression of Leibniz, the relation is interesting. Here the objective would be the secondary subject in so far as it is being held in relation as an object by the supreme subject on whom it is dependent for very power, by whom it is enjoyed, directed and perfected. By being thus held the individual subject does not become a material entity; on the other hand, at the same time he perhaps holds as his object both nature and God himself. But does not this mean, it may be suggested, that God would lose his dominancy and would be a dependent entity, on what is essentially a finite entity even according to definition? No; for in so far as there is relation shown between two entities, whilst it no doubt reveals dependence of each upon the other, it does not point to any imperilling of nature of the superior amongst them. As already hinted at, that whatever stands in an objective-relation need not be acētana (unintelligent) even at that moment, for in the case of two spiritual subjects, it may happen that each is holding the other as an objective, but that does not show any dependence except of relatedness. But in this relation between a finite subject and God as object, the superior in the relation is undoubtedly the object and not the subject, as such the object controls the subject. It is the ideal which standing in the objective-relation transforms and spiritualises the subject whilst holding him all through in relation as the primary subject. He is in fact, in some cases it is patent, that it is matter that holds the subject captive, in which case ajñā (delusion) is the result. God at the supreme person and as the supreme subjects is dominating the monad always. This would clearly reveal that the finite monad (Jīva) is organic to God, as much as God is organic to the Jīva or man. In his relation to nature, or the Universe, it is with the power of knowing and the capacity of dominating in however little measures, the Jīva holds the partial phases of nature in subjection, in so far only and in such relative degree as God wills it or according as his perfected evolution permits; in either case, it is measured by the greater expressive presence of the Ideal or the ideal person who rules him by its or his interiority and superiority over the Jīva.

Nature or Matter is mere object, absolutely subject to Brāhmaṇ. The objectivity of the selves and nature towards God, the ultimate subject is an assertion of their reality.
For, to be objective is to be real, as much as, to be subjective is to be self-evident. As such in this mutual relatedness of function as well as in substance, objective and subjective, and of the greater evidency of the subjective which controls its objective, the subjective can be, not illegitimately, claimed to be the core of the relation. The subject integrally related with its object is the real truth. The individual sentient self is organic to nature and to God, and nature and God are equally organic to the individual self. So also between Nature or matter and God, there is an inseparable (aprathaksiddha) relation. Brähmaṇ is the eternal subject, Sākṣi, which means not the pure objectless impersonal consciousness of Advaita, but the knower, the subject. “By a witness (Sākṣin) we understand some one who knows about something by a personal observation (Sākṣāth); a person who does not know cannot be a witness”. Accordingly, says Rāmānuja, ‘a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge (consciousness) is spoken of as a witness’. “प्रभु, सत्त्व अ नास नन्दवनन्वयं and Panini says साक्ष्याक्षरं सत्त्वादिः.

When the substance is thus conceived to be the subject as qualified by its object, the conception of the object translates itself to one of a mode in relation to the substance.

All philosophy aims at a definite synthetic and synoptic conception of reality. And if the qualified or rather defined, it is what it means, Being were declared to be a false representation of what is essentially undefinable and if it be suggested that even definition is an outrage against its perfection, then, for the reasons already put forward, we have to search as to where the fallacy in that objection lies. The classical dictum of Spinoza that ‘all determination is negation is perfectly true, because to define certain characters to an object or thing, were to negate their opposites and other characters or qualities to the thing. The proposition is self-evident. But does negation of those other qualities mean lessening of perfection of the thing? Truth negates false, but can we in any sense expect that to negate the false were to lessen the perfection of thing which we define as true? Perfection can only mean maximum of positive qualities and never negative qualities as well, for negative qualities are not qualities but mere abstractions of the positive, concrete in no sense. Sankara would not allow any definite character to the Absolute except in negative terms no denote, perhaps, its positivity, which he recognises it to possess, but would not at any rate, allow positive predications of which we know and infer from the nature of the world, even in its accentuated quality. But we know of no mind except a human mind at least in its basal quality, for as was said elsewhere, a divine vision must yet be a vision, a divine audition must yet be an audition. Śaṅkara maintains the Absolute to be a conscious witness Sākṣi, but would not allow it to be a subject; it is the ground of all experience of subjects and objects, but it is not at all ‘involved’ in its operation; it is not personal; it is pure, having no object and no relation. Spinoza’s dictum combined with its false rider, which is not always true, yields a qualitiless substratum, a mere Being, of which no one can tell anything, ‘into which all are dissolved and in
which none can exist*, because to touch its fringes were to lose identity, dual and individuality; but individuality is false and is due to Māya, a mysterious power; but identity with what shall it be identical or with what shall it be non-dual.?

But there is no substance apart from its attributes or relations or qualities. There is nothing of the nature of self-contradiction either in the nature of modes or relations or qualities to make use assume the impossible postulate that this world is inverted truth or essentially false or even unknowable in constitution.

The substance without its attributes and qualities, the dharmi without dharma, a guni without gunas, are distorted representations. The fact is that they are distinguishable but not separable. The nature of substance though definitely distinct from that of the attributes or modes is yet distinguishable from that of the attributes. The synthetic Unity (is it a priori?) between them, namely, substance-attribute, subject-object, spirit-matter, is the initial reality and not a resultant of the synthesising mind; it is the reality that we recognise, yet disjunct and accentuate whilst distinguishing.

Here it is useful to distinguish between modes and qualities as it would help us to arrive at the view of Rāmānuja more exactly as to the relation obtaining between the Substance and its modes, and also as to the nature of the substance itself.

A Mode or attributes is that by which we come to know the Substance, I prefer to use the word ‘mode’ as against Spinoza’s use of the word attribute, as a ‘mode’ is any dependent existence of that on which it is dependent; whereas the attribute which Spinoza defines—a definition at once vague though useful—’is that which understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance.’ Taking this to mean nothing other than a realistic definition (Kuno Fischer gives a Kantian colour), whatever mode or attributes (giving the logical general-concept of the modes, for the two primary abstract concepts of Thought and Extension) leads us to interpret or infer the character of the ultimate Being of which it is a function or dependent existence or expression, would lead us to speak of it as its attribute or mode (prakāra). Thought and extension or energy, as Spinoza would call these two secondary ultimates, or Prakṛti and individual Jīvas as Rāmānuja would call these two substantial entities, alone reveal to us the nature of Reality, though we must be careful to add that these two entities in turn seek existence and accomplishment, only in the ultimate existence or Substance or Spirit.

12 cf. Vaiśeṣika and Bhāskhara also hold that qualities cannot be conceived apart from its substance; Dharma dharmi abhedat. Cf. A substance although it is nothing apart from its qualities, must not therefore be ‘distinct from its attributes.’ In fact, a substance is not to be identified with “any or all of those qualities” which constitute the nature of substance nor with the “aggregate of its qualities or any system formed of them”; cf. Nature of Existence: Mc Taggart. Bk. II ch. V.
This Highest concrete entity unlike the Spinozistic substance, is the Brāhmaṇ and no generic thing. The ontological search leads us to the concept of their cause or ground which is a unitary substance and is both actual and real, as also ideal and perfect, to which all creation moves as its end. Rāmānuja holds that these modes form an eternal dependent relation as prakāra of Brāhmaṇ, whom Brāhmaṇ in turn animates as their self. Thus whenever we speak of matter and its energy or activity or evolution, we are in reality speaking of the self or spirit, who directs its evolutions on such lines as to yield the greatest benefit or greatest expression. Whenever we speak of the individual finite selves and their activities and realisations, we are at the same time implicitly expressing a knowledge about God who sustains them and directs them, helping them to the ideal or perfection. The energies of men and of matter are all sustained by their relation to Brāhmaṇ. These two entities standing in this inevitable and inseparable (aprathaksiddha) relation to Being or Brāhmaṇ who is the ultimate spirit, form as such, his modes or expressions of Power, and find their realisation in Brāhmaṇ and no where else.

In so far as these two entities form inseparable relations and eternal relations, for we can never dissolve matter or jives (minds) however much we may spiritualise or etherise or exalt matter into nullity, for even then they must stand in that objective relation forming the ground of material phenomena or sensation continuum; nor the individual selves or monads, however much we may diffuse them or exalt them into mere thrills on the ocean-lap of spiritual existence of Being, or channels or foci of the vast powerful flood of God’s Śakti. We cannot deprive the souls of their specific individuality even in their highest identity in functioning, which because of the fact that they can never be disjuncted or dissolved into a single source, must by that fact from a unitary existential relation, integral and organic, with Brāhmaṇ. Brāhmaṇ thus becomes the only one without a second ruler and self; which only means that these modes are not modes of any other entity, as there cannot be any such. What so ever they exists in this single (Ekam) intelligent eternal ruling principle, sustained by that immanent principle through its bliss (ānandatva) the world of nature and jives; though them Hew reveals His blissful blessed qualities of love, knowledge etc (Kalyāṇa-guṇāḥ).

13 Šrī Bhāṣya; I. i 6; I. i. 23, 24, 25, & 26.
14 Šrī Bhāṣya; I. i 31; I. iv. 22 & 11 iii 41. “action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest” cf. Keno Up. 3. 1. 11. & 4.
15 Šrī Bhāṣya: “When a thing is apprehended under the form “this is such and such”, the element apprehended as ‘such’ is what constitutes a mode; now as this element is relative to the thing, and finds accomplishment in the thing only; hence the word also, which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing”. (pp 227)
16 Šrī Bhāṣya I. i.1
An attribute or mode constitutes whatever stands in an integral inseparable absolute eternal dependent relationship with its substance. Thus a dharma or whatever stands in this relation and is sustained by another entity would be called its mode. Consciousness would as such, be also called a dharma of its substrate or the intelligence of which it is a function, for “it is that which stands forth or manifests itself through its own being to its object its own being” or it is a function of the ego.

Anūubhutitvam nām vartamānadaśayām sarvastāyāva svāṣrayāmprati prakāśa mānāvatvam svasatāyāva svavṣayasādhanatvavam.

As such it is known technically to distinguish it from its substrate which is also called Jñānasvarūpa, “Dharmabhūta-jñānam.” Nature or matter is a function of the absolute intelligence of the unitary relation immanent between them. The Dharma or Dharmi is distinguished by the superiority or inferiority, imperfection or perfection, of that between which dependence is to be shown. The superior or the more vital in the relation being called the Dharmi, and the lesser as the Dharma of the former. I identify for convenience, Dharma with a mode, an entity, and not a quality (guṇa), which stands as an absolutely dependent existence forming an integral relation with that on which it depends. It follows thus, that the worlds are predicates of the Being.

2. Quality:

A substance may be conceived to be different from its absolute relations or modes, (though it is essentially an intellectual effort and it is this distinction that is the cause of our ignorant activities) even then, we can sketch its nature, Svarūpa, as distinct from its modes. Whilst some things stand in an inseparable relation to a particular thing, as such constituting what are called its modes, it may possess individual qualities expressive of its perfections. Brāhmaṇ as the ideally perfect, as the absolute Spirit is all intelligent, great and powerful, merciful (dayamaya),

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17 “The body is in reality, nothing but a mode of the self, but for the purpose of sharing the distribution of things, the word ‘body’ is used in a limited sense.
18 Śrī Bhāṣya I. i.1 cf. Stma siddhi. Yamuna
20 God is called Sarvadhar,
yathodkandu gaṇvāṇam parvatāśu vidhavartih ī
evam dharman ptka paśyamsthānēvānuvidhāvati ī
21 cf. Śrī Bhāṣya, I. I 13 where it is maintained that quality is not mere quality but always in co-ordination with its substance. A reference may be made to McTaggart’s chapter on Quality in his Nature of Existence, where he analyses the whole subject. It is in my opinion the nearest approach to Rāmānuja’s view. But this chapter was written prior to any reference to that book.
omniscient and omnipotent etc.,\textsuperscript{22} which qualities (guṇas) cannot be deprived from their substance; shall we say, that just as when all the qualities of redness, volume, weight, and every sensory predication is removed there is nothing left, so also, these qualities make it the being it is. It is these guṇas that constitute its adjectives and perfections. Substance is not a mere ‘that’ or an undetermined ‘somewhat’, to which the qualities, the ‘whats’, are added afterwards. These guṇas characterise it as the highest superior and lord over its modes. Nothing exists except as qualitatively determined; existence and nature are in the strictest sense inseparable (aprathaksidda) and its existence as such is determined by the systematic unity of its qualities, expressed through its functions. Qualities represent the order and kind of existence of the existents. But it is also true that the relations determine the quality of the whole.

A further distinction between a quality and an attribute or a mode (dharma) is that a dharma is an entity, which can, in a certain measure, be realised apart from its dharmi, as its extension or function, just as the rays of light may be perceived as apart from its source, though we certainly infer it to have a source or ground. It is an entity (dravya, sometimes translated as substance, meaning, having substantiveness) a function that may be perceived or realised even when we do not see the substance of which it is function. Thus it is not absolutely necessary in practice, to inquire about God whenever we perceive Nature or individual jives. But a quality as quality cannot be seen elsewhere than in its subject of which, it is a quality or guṇa. The object cannot be except with its qualities and qualities cannot be seen except in their substance. Consciousness, as a function of the Ego, and as an extension of the ego, stands in a unique relation to the Ego, seen only during the activity of the Ego. Consciousness however is not a mode though it is a function, for the function assists the functioner to know or enjoy other objects, whilst it acquires no such tertium quid to make known itself to its substrate. For the acceptance of a tertium quid involves infinite regress. This is the radical distinction. But the character of the Subject as an Intelligence, is seen nowhere else except in the subject himself, though that intelligent quality is attributed only as a result of conscious function, as such constitutes the nirupita-Svarūpa-guṇa or viseshana of the subject. God is conceived to be omnipotent and omniscient because those are inferred to be his nature as seen in his ‘functions’ or modes. The quality of a ‘mode’, we can speak of, just as when we say, that matter is unintelligent or that nature is blind, or that it is the existing ground of

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. \textit{Yatindramatadipika} pp 83.

In Rāmānuja ’s system, Īśvara or Brahman is He who possesses not only these powers, indeed those powers are a consequence of his being the Self of the Prakriti and the Purushas and they his body (sarirabhuta).

Śrī Bhāṣya I. i. 1.
material things or perceptions, and the absolutely dependent and the eternal objective that never knows to be a subject. But we cannot define the quality of a guña except as a perceived exemplification in the things and it cannot be abstractly defined. Redness is redness and is a simple sensation of a specific wave-length of light; it cannot be described in any other simpler way. We can only reiterate that quality as its quality. A relation is ‘between’ somethings; a quality ‘in’ and ‘of’ something. We can technically call the mode as the Svarupa-nirupaka-dharma, and the quality as the nirupita-Svarūpa-guña or vishēshana, the former points to the essence of the thing, the latter to the discovered feature of a thing in addition to the former.

Having made this distinction between a dharma and a guña (it is however unfortunate that neither Rāmānuja nor his commentators have given specific terms for differentiating between these two, which they certainly do and must distinguish from one another), a qualitiless substance is a nullity; an attributeless or mode-less substance or existence an incomprehensibility. These relations are absolute as there can be no separation of these to form any others. The Absolute Brāhmaṇ thus, by being the sustainer (dharayitum) of the modes, reveals himself as having these relations within himself. Variable relations, however, subsist between the individual intelligences among themselves and in their relations with partial phases of Nature. Thus the so-called external relations subsist and obtain in the case of individual selves within their own commune, and in their relations with things of the universe. It would be meaningless to hold that external relations obtain between the Absolute and its modes, as if the modes are not sustained by the Spirit that bathes them. Absolute relations that are impossible of sundering or varying are internal, because immanently ground in their very nature, as such, are eternal relations within the bosom of reality; the variable relations are external relations, between the reals. Brāhmaṇ does not rest upon external relations, for it would mean that there can be a bare being without qualities and modes, or else it would mean that it is dependent upon something other than itself for very being. And both these explanations are absurd. On the other hand, dependence is for the individual selves or jives, and for Prakṛti, which have external relations as between themselves.

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23 I use between something and not between “things”, because whilst a relation is truly between two or more things, yet it sometimes happens in introspection that it is “between” itself, that is what is meant by Prathvaktva. A relation can never be reduced to a quality, a”between” into one of “in” or “of”. It can equally never happen that a quality can be reduced to one of relation. A mode is that which stands in a relation; it is a substance standing in an asymmetrical dependent relation with another substance; a relation of a “substance to its quality is asymmetrical since a substance cannot inhere in a quality.”

24 I have no authority for calling them so; on the other hand the view maintained by some others seems to be different. Any way I had a justification as in the case of Dharma-bhuta-jnana. Hence this.
Relations per se do not reveal any dependence except in this way that to be dependent is not to forsake. In philosophy the tendency of every idealistic method has been and is always to show dependence upon the Subject and Spirit and to stress the independence of Spirit and subject. But such a dependence and independence is only relatively distinguished by the superiority of that between which these terms are used, and is merely puerile when this independence is condemned to an absolute subsumption or as unnecessary to that on which it is dependent or to which it is related. Every phase and effort of the subject produces only such phases and reactions on its objects, as such, the subject might legitimately be called the absolute destiner of its objects. But to be an absolute destiner or even a destiner is not the same thing as to be absolutely independent of that which is destined. Independence does not mean unrelateness nor does perfection mean non-qualifiedness or non-determination. The independence of spirit or ultimate being or God, consists in its supreme power of destining, in its exaltation and in its perfection, over and above the dependents, in a word, because of its infinite transcendence whilst it works or exhibits itself through them as an immanent goal. The Ideal that works through the individual finites imperfect as they are, does not get lowered by such a working; it only shows its own virility and superiority over every obstacle which are not obstacles, or rather only apparent and seeming obstacles if at all.

The establishment of the intrinsic relation between modes and the substance, in other words, the assertion of reality to individual selves and the sensuous nature and their unitary relation to Brāhma or the ultimate substance, is the establishing of the reality of the substance itself. Neither bare singularity of Advaita, for identity can obtain only between two real (and be it noted, not unreal) entities, nor even the absolute plurality which Dvaita owns, could be real, till a real synthesis at once logical and true to experience between unity and multiplicity is achieved. And this is achieved by Rāmānuja through this conception of unity which organically holds the multiplicity within itself and gives it the character of truth. Whilst reducing the relation to one of model relation, just like Spinoza, there is here no abstract general concept which the Being of Spinoza certainly is, which makes it impossible for him to guarantee to the modes any individual existence, not even could Spinoza derive those modes once he has refunded them into their source or ground (for out of the abstract how could the concrete issue at all? a fact that Spinoza quite realised)—Rāmānuja does not dissolve them into he abstract Universal, but whilst keeping them real, subsumes them as modes or real functions which never are dissolved but are only kept back from functioning during the periods of Pralaya, in the same way as consciousness is suspended but not extinguished as a function of the intelligent subject, as it is the characteristic expression, attribute and function of the intelligent subject he is. We cannot at any moment except under delusion or illusion, disjunct the relation between these triune entities so egregiously as to call them disparate or unconnected entities. The possibility of delusion arises only in the case of less perfect entities viz., individual monads, from the non-perception of these absolute relations
and the upward thrusts of Spiritual life, and from the non-perception of their real
dependence upon the ultimate unity of power, life and truth which is Brähmaṇ. This
possibility of accordance with separate activities or individualised activities which
Brähmaṇ seeks fulfilment in and through particular Jīvas blurs the sense of the whole
and the One, which is natural to them, in such wise as to induce in them an atrophy of
real thought, in such relative degrees as is necessary for the consummation of the
ideal or goal which God wills and to which creation moves, and accelerates in them
an activity of crystalised and centralised egoism (ahaṅkāra and mamakara).

The Nature of the Modes.

The Jīvas: There are infinite eternal spiritual or monadic entities. These are
eternal, Rāmānuja says, not in the sense that “all has itself in that” or “all this indeed
is Brähmaṇ in which case, that general enunciation would mean that even ether and
created elements would have to be conceived as eternal,” (II. iii. 18) but in quite a
different sense that its character changes not, but merely “passes over into a different
condition”, from inactivity of deep sleep to the activity of lila-period. Thus though an
effect, the individual self or jiva is unproduced. “The intelligent one is not born nor
does it die.”

2. The soul’s essential nature is spiritual, that is, it is a knowing subject. It is
essentially a knower (I. i. 13) “Different from this self consisting of understanding
(Vijnana), there is the inner self consisting of Bliss….. The soul, in the states of
bondage and release alike is a knowing subject.” It is “not mere intelligence as sugata
and Kapila hold” nor “is the soul, as Kanada thinks, essentially non-intelligent,
comparable to a stone, which intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it”.
(II. iii) “He is a person whose self is knowledge.” But because it is a knowing subject, it
does not mean that it is omnipresent. For it “passes out” and “returns”²⁵ as such
infinitesimal, a monad,²⁶ (II. iii. 20.)

It is the Brähmaṇ that is called the infinite and “great not the individual”. “The
individual self is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of hair divided
a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite”. And how it could be infinite is explained in
the next sutra by saying that it knowledge is infinitely extendable or pervasive,

²⁵ “By that light this self departs either through the eye, or through the skull, or other
parts of the body” “all those who pass away out of the world go to the moon” and “return from
that world to the world of action.” Brihad Up. 4. 4. 2.
²⁶ Introduction to Pāñcarātra O. Schrader pp. 57.
Svārūpam aṣṭānām svaḥ jīvanānanda kailaṅgatam ।
Trasracenaṁpramāṇasa te rasmikōṭivibhūsitaḥ ॥
comparing such a feature to the scent (gandha) of sandal ointment which spreads all over the body refreshing it when it is applied to a particular portion of the body alone, (II. iii. 24) or just like a source of light spreading its light all throughout space. (II. iii. 26) “By such a residence of the soul in the heart of the physical body (is it the sūkṣma body?) with the help of the examples of sandal paste and flames which extend their scent and light though resident in a particular portion of space, through their qualities of scent and light throughout the body and space, (II. iii. 25 & 26) proves the capacity of a real nature of the soul to shine, and to know reality in full through its essential quality of consciousness (dharmabhutanana) and to control and sustain its body.

3. The designation of knowledge as self, e.g., “He is the person whose self is knowledge”27, is made only because it is an essential quality of the same (I. i 13.; II. iii. 29 & III. ii. 28). “Since knowledge is an attribute which I met with wherever a self is, there is no objection to the self being designated by that attribute. vijñānasya yāvadātam bhavidharmatvavātēna tadpadēśō na doṣa since in fact that quality contributes to define its (self’s) essential character. svarūpa nirūpaṇadharmatvādityārthā. Similarly, the intelligent highest self is called ‘Bliss’ (anandamaya), because bliss is its essential quality as ‘knowledge’. It cannot be maintained that it is mere consciousness.

This idea has been refuted so often and need not be refuted as many times again. But it has a real ground, because the observation that the different individuals have got the identical character of conscious subjects, gives rise to the plausible inference that they must have been plucked from one vast stretch of consciousness due to some mysterious power or limitation, say, avidya or upādhis. But the inference has got merely an air of plausibility, and is not founded on facts, nor is it conducive to logical explanation, of the relation between genus and individual, or concept and intuition. As will be showed in a succeeding paragraph, the whole misconception is due to this reversion of explanation which Platonically treats the ‘idea’ as the more perfect, and the individual as merely the ‘manifestation’ of the ‘idea’, which exactly is not the case. For, the concept is dependent on the intuition and not vice versa. If dependence is to be shown at all, the dependence is not on the side of the individual, in as much as there is the dependence of the former on the latter.

The fallacy of deriving the individual from the single source as Intelligence, is patent for a further reason. For whilst “substance is an individualised unity of concrete characters”, when we “abstract from the original characters of two exactly

27 “That which consists of understanding (vijñāna) is the individual soul, not the internal organ (budhi) only: for the formative element. Māya (consisting of vijñānāmaya) indicates a difference (between vijñāna & vijñānāmaya). As vijñānāmaya can be explained as jiva, we have no right to neglect māya, as unmeaning (I. I 13.pp. 213 & 214).
similar substances, we are still left with a purely numerical point of difference, i.e., with a diversity of ‘matter’. Thus ‘matter’ is ‘signed’ with quantity i.e., it exists in numerically diverse portions and thus serves as the ultimate principle of individuation”.\(^{28}\) The individuality of each of these entities is a certain peculiarity, which whilst it expresses or gives expression to purposes identifiable with those of others or even of that ultimate intelligent being, yet holds its own individuality which cannot be identified with any original character (whether quality or relation), “marking it as numerically distinct from any other even exactly similar entity”. Leibniz held that each monad though similar in character in being similar, was not identifiable with the rest even in the case of ‘identity of indiscernables’, for he held (perhaps a belief) that “two different subjects A and B cannot have precisely the same individual affection; it being impossible that the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another.” So much so, Prof. McTaggart remarks about the principle of identity of indiscernables, that it really is the ‘principle of the dissimilarity of the diverse.’\(^{29}\) Every one of us has got individual experiences which cannot be communicated to others. They form our private or individual subjective. Our dreams, even our emotions and perceptions, let alone the spiritual experiences, are our very own. Further “the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself and can explain the presence of unconscious and non-conscious states and acts, if it were only admitted that there are infinite individual selves who experience such states. If it were mere consciousness there could be no unconsciousness or veiling at all.” (II. iii 32) And also, If there were not so many individuals there must either be a wholesale veiling or wholesale emancipation. But as Samkhya showed, such is not the case; and therefore there must be infinite souls (Puruṣas or jivas). And since as Rāmānuja states the soul always abides in bodies (merely sūkṣma or gross and sūkṣma, for when the soul leaves its physical body it carries its linga Sarīra with it, and has even in the realised condition a pure sattva śuddhasattva body capable of being utilised in every way by the soul) which only shows that for enjoyment or activity, a body is absolutely necessary, and there alone can consciousness take place not elsewhere. \(\text{Asmāk śaṛṣasyāntare vāvasthitat vādātmanasta traivōpalabdhinayatrei vyavasthāsiddhiḥ. (II.iii.32)}\)

In passing we may refer to the small discussion which Rāmānuja engages in with the Bheda-bhedavadinsa. (. 191)


\(^{29}\) Phil. Review. Jan 1927. art. On Principle of Individuation: Idea of God. 264. cf. “finite centres may ‘overlap’ indefinitely in content ex termini, they cannot ‘overlap’ at all in existence: their very raison d’etre is to be distinct and in that sense, separate and exclusive, focalisations”
a. Refuting the view of the Bheda-abheda vādins that the individuals souls are identical and different from Brāhmaṇ at the same time and are real though vanishing distinctions ultimately, an argument that strongly recalls the Bosanquetian theory, Rāmānuja carefully analyses the question thus; “You (Bhedabheda vādins) have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same thing viewed as effect and individual. But that this view is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show.” He analyses in proceeding to show its untenability, the concept of genus and individual. He had in an earlier sutra (I. i. 1) suggested ‘that the species is the form of the individual’. vyaktēstu jātrākāra jñāti tadaśrayatayā pratītiḥ. He states again in other words, that “genus constitutes the mode and the individual that to which the mode belongs”. It is not a “fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of Unity in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; but whenever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form ‘this is such and such’, it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode and that to which the attribute or mode belongs”. (I. i. 4.)

b. He says “the difference belongs to the individual and non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect” And if it be held that in one way a thing is non-different, and in the other, different, that is “the difference and non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects”, then “we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects, but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character not their non-difference. And even if we concede that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects, constitutes a ‘simultaneous difference and non-difference’ in the thing which is’ their ‘substrate’, how he asks, “can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes” viz., (difference and identity)? “If,” he proceeds, “the two aspects on the one hand and the thing on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, we shall be led into a regressus in infinitum” (I. i. 4. pp. 194)

By this argument which Rāmānuja thinks is complete and most effective, the theory which holds that the Absolute is by the limitation of avidyākamakarmanā, the three logical, moral and spiritual limitations or upādhis, sliced into the several individual selves, which at the end, become restored into the original substance of the Brāhmaṇ, is absolutely demolished. This slicing into pieces or khandas in order to get at the jivas (souls) and things, is the only way by which the limitation might be successfully achieved, which method however, opens, the gates of atheistic materialism of Charvakas, for matter alone is capable of being thus cut or sliced and never spirit, for it is exactly spirit which brings unity into existence, as such, itself
Rāmānuja shows that once we refuse to acknowledge the specious simplicity of Māyavāda or advaita, we cannot halt at any half-way house of Bhāskara-vāda but must accept not only the reality of selves as Bhāskara does but further admit that their existence is indissoluble into any simpler substances or substance. For Bhāskara, the world exists from the beginning of the creative impulse as distinct and indissoluble into its original source till the pralaya; in this he agrees with Rāmānuja. But then, we must note the difference, namely, that Bhaskara does not admit the reality of matter as the eternally related and subsumed entity but only as the creative prakrit-shakti of God and also a spiritual entity in its essence. In a word, until the reality of all the three entities, matter, souls, and Brahma, the person who hold these former in an integral unity within himself, are all recognized there can be no way out of the impasse of solipsism and contradiction. “And it is false to maintain that the individual self and the highest enter into any real union (absorption), for one substance cannot pass over into the nature of another entity or substance. Paramātmano yūgah paramānty itiṣyate mityaḥdanyahamyahi na iti tadyantāmyataḥ (Vishnu Purana 2-14-27)

Further there must be distinct selves seeking perfection, and if such a postulate that is self-evident for spiritual life, is declared to be unreal, then the power of agency in actions ethical, is lost; there can be no moral life or even such a thing as spiritual achievement. Rāmānuja says that the fact that one ‘knows’ qualifies him for action. jñānaprasārē tu kaṛtutvamastayēva (I.i.1). Thus the finite self-hood, if it were a vanishing distinction, would, firstly, give no joy and certainly no satisfaction; secondly, such a distinction is perceived; thirdly to declare it unreal is to cut at the root of ethical and spiritual and religious aspiration. If it should merely mean that the ‘I’ is vanishing distinction and an unreal existence and deserves to be so annihilated in the Absolute, who shall exist to say, Rāmānuja pertinently asks that he hath realised the absolute or he s that?

To therefore distinguish between spiritual entities and their attributes or quality of ‘knowing’ which constitutes their essential nature is quite valid, as it does away with the apparent simplicity underlying the advaita theory of reducing all finite selves into a vast experiences with the help of an inexplicable Māya or avidya which creates these focalisations on its bosom without involving it at all—mere individuality-less foci and imperfections of al all-embracing Aṇubhuti.

To be for a subject, is to know. In which case, the natural extension for a subject’s cognitive activity when uninterferred with by any media, would be cognition of the whole of reality. Our problem then would be, not what we know, but why we do not know what we out to know? How does this limitation arise in the sphere of our cognitive area? And why life being what it is, the function of the self implies a necessary and natural residence of it in the body? And if the quantitative or spatial reference apply not to the soul* size (as it seems inevitable that we cannot but speak
of it in such a way) how does it habitate the body and hold its strings in direction and function of the organism in all its actions without whose residence or presence, (unless we are going to hold along with the Charvakas and the Behaviourists of the present day, that there is not soul or self or even a conscious spiritual subject, all action, even intelligent action being due to the interactions of the cerebral cortical spheres with the stimuli transmitted through the neurones to it) no activity could be possible? Self, conceived in the Spiritual sense or the Leibnizin sense of qualitative infinitesimal (as the quantitative and spatial applies to the atoms), should have an operative centre in the body through which it animates its particular body, dominates and enjoys itself in it, and realises its own true nature as a subject action in conjunction with an overflowing intelligence it discovers afterward, an Intelligence it recognizes as the final destiner and goal of the physical and moral and spiritual order.30 (II. iii. 39-40). The question of exact residence is perhaps a matter of belief and Vedanta along with Yōga, keeps it resident in the heart, operating from that central point both the head as also the limbs.

Logically speaking, the individual finite existence of the self is a primary certainty. The individual selves also exist in the same way as independent entities, a fact of the inferential existence, as even the most barefaced absolutists and nihilists have to accept, and which all idealists worth their philosophy maintain, or a fact of direct cognition as the Intuitionists hold. This fact of recognition of other individual centres of consciousness is inferential it is claimed, but there is no other reason for that opinion but the prejudice against realism. And accepting it to be such, there is no reason to hold it to be mainly inferential. Perhaps the fact of calling it mainly inferential-necessity is a logical necessity as well, not only on account of the actual cognition of other bodies made up in the same way as our own, but it involves a mixing up of each of our private universes if there is an identification of the different

30. Rāmānuja recognizes though his attack on the nirguṇa Brahman of Advaita, that a bare being is a nonentity and is a meaningless concept. So also a mere point of bare existence is also meaningless. (II. iii. 34). The individual self though it apparently appears to be such a bare point of existence when not in conjunction with the nature during the pralayakāla, is not such a bare existentiality. The functional attitude is available to such a focus depositary which the self is in reality, only when such an attitude is encouraged by being in a relational attitude of subject-object (samyōga) with nature which forms the world of realisation of ethical observance and action and its conscious commerce with God or reason expressed in such an objective system. It is this relational attitude and dependence on nature and God which makes it the real self it is, that rescues it from being the bare point of mere existence identifiable with any material atom. The individual self, thus possess the triple character of jnātrītva, and loātrītva bhoktrītva of cognition, conation and sensation or enjoyment. But its independence all the while remains and in no case is it sundered even by the highest, for that would remove the character of the soul as a spiritual and moral entity or individual. Its continued identity is the independence that it possesses in its own right. (II. 3. 41). These characteristics constitute the “partial similarity”, their dissimilarity however, consists in their diversity of state or function.
private universes, which is not the case. As Rāmānuja maintains, there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual experiences of each of us, our enjoyments and realisations only if concede to the infinite (uncountable) selves, reality, eternity, and immortality. (II. iii. 48)

1. The individual soul is a part of Brāhmaṇ

The specific term part, amsa, leads to the question of the relation between whole and part. If the part were to be treated in terms of extension and the whole too treated in the same way, then we would be confronted with the problem whether the whole is extended and material, and Brāhmaṇ being conceived as the whole, is material.

Rāmānuja therefore defines a part: 1stly, it is not a part of extension (beginning with defining firstly with what it is not) of Brāhmaṇ as all imperfections would belong to Brāhmaṇ. 2ndly, nor is it a piece of Brāhmaṇ as Brāhmaṇ does not admit of being divided into pieces (khandas) (II. iii. 42).

3rdly, defining it in terms of what it is, it is a part in the sense “that it constitutes one place (desa) of something nd hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshana) is a part of the thing distinguished by the attribute.

Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand towards each other in the relation of part and whole (amśāṁśibhava), yet we observe in them an essential difference of character. And “as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it”—an attribute sustained in the relation by it. As the Śrī Bhāṣya passage runs, “Lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem;” the same relation holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, and qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way, souls as well as nonsentient matter stand to Brāhmaṇ in the relation of parts (amśa) (III. ii. 28). And whenever difference is declared, it is this difference in character (svabhāvavaiλakshanyam) a definite spreading out of this relation between substance and attribute that is made. Whenever on the other hand, unity or nondifference is declared “they are based on the circumstance that that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance they distinguish and hence are fundamentally valid” (II.iii.45) Abhēdanidēśāstū pṛtviksadhanaṁ śeṣaṁānam viśeṣasya paryantatvamāśritāṁ mukhyatvēnōpa padhante

In the sense of attribute-nature (viseshanatva) which is one of essential dependence for sustenance for its very being upon a substrate which is its ground,
the individual self is a part of the substance which is whole and full in itself and absolutely indivisible.

So also the world and Brāhmaṇ stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, “the former being like the light the latter like the luminous body, or the former like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body the latter being like the soul” (II.i.iii.46) ēvaṁ prabhāprabhāvadrūpeṇa śaktiśaktimadrūpeṇa śararitmbhavēṇa cāṃsāṃśibhavaṃ jagabrahānōḥ.

It is clear from what has been stated that this interpretation of the relation between whole and part, is peculiar to this system alone, as it alone translates that relation to one of substance and attribute. Spinoza had, however, done like-wise; but here unlike there, no method of conversion has been undertaken. There is a suspicion in Spinoza’s system whether when he deduces more geometrico, he is thinking of a part or mode as a khanda (piece). Rāmānuja obviates any such difficulty by his specific interpretation of the relation in the way sketched above. The advantages of the interpretation of Rāmānuja are patent and decidedly more than others. The attributes have relations, integral and vital with the substance, just as a part has got to the whole, for where can a part be except as a part-of-the-whole or an attribute except as an attribute-of-a-substance?—yet that attribute could be called a part (amśa) without impairing either the perfection of the hole of which it is a part or amśa, or losing its own specific individuality as amśa. The connection has not got the defect of de-spiritualisation of the Spirit, which we have somehow accepted to be the whole, and yet it does not dematerialise matter except in the sense of making it a fuller external expression of spirit’s activities, making it yield to the stress of the spirit, in making it the nature it is. Nor even does it throw all individualisation or individuality to mere continuity of the unindividualised. Whilst guaranteeing to individual selves and Prakṛti (Śakti) an individual eternity (though they are, to a great extent in the former case, and entirely, in the latter case, different from their substance) they could yet be called ‘mamaivāmśa’ as the Gīta passage runs (XV. 7).

Whilst the comparisons hold legitimately (holding of course, that they are no other than mere analogies) yet there is underlying them a suggestion of a spiritual notion of the relation of part to the whole, since it does away with the faulty conception of part as material part or even as a spiritual part which can be extinguished (as Bhāskara held) in the absolute’s vast bosom when it attains fullness of perfection gradually. Rāmānuja himself condemns any other notion as mere ābhasa (mere argument); for the arguments which seek to prove the being whose nature is absolutely uniform light i.e., Intelligence or consciousness but differentiated by limiting adjuncts (upādhi) is fallacious, for “obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light means destruction of that light,” (II.i.iii.49) Prakāśaścaksva rūpasya prakāśitrīdhananāṃ prakāśanāśa ēvēti prāgevōpa pāditam. And further this arguments would ruin the conception of spirit too fatally. But in the sense argued
above, the finite is not derived from the infinite since by such a derivation the finite could not be, if its aggregation with the rest should give back the infinite again. The presence of the finite would be the death of the infinite as an actual or acting existence and vice versa. The conception of Rāmānuja of the part is a spiritual relation as contradistinct from spiritual derivation between whole and part. It is not a derivative relation at all. In which case, not only need the souls alone be the parts (because they are spiritual entities), but also matter, which stands as a dependent existence (as a mode or dharma of the spirit), whose Svabhāva is so observe to that of spirit, can be a part. The souls are finite, and as finites they could continue to exist even though they may attain to the infinity of knowledge, and that does not mean loss of infinity to Brāhmaṇ. There is no subterfuge employed here to arrive at the finites through either the imposing of a real or unreal upādi or māya, as real differences are explainable by a direct vision and experience viz., of the perceived integral relation between and the souls and nature, which can easily be translated into one of whole part. But the merit of realising this simple procedure is entirely Rāmānuja ‘s contribution to Philosophy. Further this relation alone is relevant to the discussion of the eternity of he individuality of the ego. Matter also thus, as already pointed out, stands in the relation of a mode and amśa of Brāhmaṇ.” “The material embodiments like those of man etc., possess equally with generic and other qualifications, the character of being entirely dependent on the individual self, the character of being serviceable only to that self and the character of being a mode of that self. So also the individual selves with their embodiments form the body of the Highest Self and possess the characteristic of his modes.” “This subtle matter stands to Brāhmaṇ the cause of the world, in the relation of a mode (prakāra) and it is Brāhmaṇ viewed as having such a mode.”

Viewed thus, the primary fact that emerges out of this discussion is that the attribute can be conceived to be the body of the substance; secondly, that, as such, it can also be considered as the part of the substance; thirdly, that the part need not on the above two scores, be of the same nature as the substance of which it is an attribute, indeed, that it can be of a very obverse nature, provided it satisfies the definition of a body or attribute or part, and that of being absolutely serviceable to its substance or subject.

Recapitulating the chapter;

Substance is Spirit and the ultimate ground and cause (cf. 1st chapter.) The concept of substance in Rāmānuja ‘s Philosophy is at once concrete, universal, and real. It is concrete because it is not a generic chapter or a general idea or a formal attribute, but an actual and acting presence qualified by qualities of perfection. It is not an abstraction from existence, every other thing which exists outside it alone is an abstraction. In one sense, it is that which guides the process towards the highest emergence of perfection in the time-series. It is not abstracted from existence either
by being made into a passive background on which is superimposed the fluctuating veil of Nature or Prakṛti, not is it abstracted from reality, existing as an inferred idea, essentially timeless, because having no actuality. On the other hand, it is concrete, because, whilst standing as the eternally unchanging (in constitution qua spirit) permanent, it functions through the universal process, which it holds in absolute dependent relation, enduring as a dynamic existence at once compelling everything, though never compelled. It is timeless because it controls time, and eternity means enduring through out time sarvakāla vaṛtamānatva hi niyatvam, and uses time to execute its own purpose and ends, which, at best, are a revelation of its own Bliss and a movement of Ananda. Having its own purposes and ends and having the power to achieve them, this Absolute Intelligence is the supreme Person, or personality, and we may agree with Bhāskhara in maintaining it to have no specific form, or with Rāmānuja in holding it to have a perfect form. (Sarvakalyāṇāgūṇa mūrtitvam)

It is universal, because whilst holding in absolute-relation every existence, souls and matter, it is neither coerced nor exhausted by any one or all of them. We might more rightly say, that it is not only universal but that what in the universe could exhaust him, is nothing. The Absolute, some maintain, would consist of God and the world in which God is immanent, while yet transcending it. This Krause calls Panentheism. This might be what we can call the Brāhmaṇ of Rāmānuja, but I am not quite sure whether some others would so take it. But that it is not pantheism one could very well affirm.

It is ideal, in the sense that it is always Spirit, perfect and compelling from the universe or nature absolute obedience and making it the universe, it is. As it guides all nature as an immanent presence towards the final end which is perfect enjoyment and perfection to all the souls. It stands as the teleological goal—as the Ideal that reveals itself more and more fully in the process through its predicates. This idea of the Absolute is a “rational ideal; it may be without a flaw”. But as the section on the Sastrayonitvat (I. i. 3) suggests, such a God we cannot prove anymore than we can disprove, but in its use, it is ‘regulative’, and perhaps, the Sabda that so proves him is only appealing to the regulative truth and intuition.

The substance is qualified, as such, true to experience; it is integrally related, therefore, it is real, and as it is distinct from its relations, it is pure and dominating, so as to be called their ground and substrate, and the only one, in the sense of ole ground and owner and ultimate substance. The qualities of the ultimate substance, though possible exaggerations of our own conceptions of beauty, power, goodness, and mercy (daya) are by no means unreal, but really attributable to Brāhmaṇ,  

However inadequate they might be in themselves. Badarayana himself confesses agreeing with Badari and Asmarathya, that such attributions are only to make it possible for us to conceive the ever unexhaustible and inexpressible infiniteness of God, between Nature and God, between Nature and the Jávas, are real. Relations bind only when the dominancy of the objective is characterised by a gripping impotency on the part of the subject, though, even there, the subject does, however inadequately fashion its object. On the other hand, when the subject completely utilises and values its object, then the subject is no longer impotent but is the lord of the object. This measure of potency determines the superiority of Bráhman, the Absolute Kshetragna or Knower, over the individuals, which measure they do not attain even in their most perfect stage, for they cannot be capable of starting or withdrawing creation (i.i.2 Janmadasya IV.iv.17 Jagadvyāparavarjam samāno jyotiṣa). Though they are then capable of equal enjoyment (IV. iv 21) and attain to equality, samatvam, with the highest. The Individual souls are also capable of equality of perfection in union, the Individual effects all things like divisibility when released. Imperfection cannot cling to Bráhman, in the shape of contact with nature or with bodies in its incarnations, for as the passage runs “connexion with one and the same body is for the individual source of disadvantage, while for the highest Bráhman, it is noting of the sort, but constitutes an accession of glory, in so far as it manifests him as Lord and ruler” (III.ii.13) ēkasmi trēvadēhasaṇyogo jāvasapuryaṣartha parasya tu tadbhavaṇ niyamnr̥piṣyaṇa ādipītyōgaṇa.

The relation of substance to its predicates or the modes is made to give the cue to every other relation, viz. subject object, soul-body, whole-part. The part need not be of the nature of the whole, the whole may be spiritual, the part may be material. The whole may not be conceived in terms of extension, the part then could not be derived; as such the part should not be conceived as a khanda or piece of the whole, but only as its inseparable (aprathaksidda) conjunct.

That which determines the character of the part is its entire dependence on the substance, though khandatva does obtain in the limited sense to material things. Dependence determines amśatva superiority determines substantiveness, vīshesha, and wholeness. This absolute dependence being the character of Nature (jagat) and the Jávas, they constitute as such the parts of Bráhman.

Concluding, the ultimate substance is One only, it is Intelligence not mere consciousness (āṇubhūti or samvid). The substance is a qualified personality. It has got internal relations as within itself between its modes nature and jávas which form its

32 Dravida Bhāṣya
33 Nyāya Siddhanjanam: Vēdanaṇa Charya,
prakāra. These prakāras are aprathaksiddha or inseparable. Brāhmaṇ is the one supreme existence. God with his predicates or God as with his worlds and selves in the real ultimate truth (satyam), not an unrelated bare being or Consciousness. This Ultimate Being stands as the Ultimate Synthesis, the Real Unity, and is the Absolute, real, universal, and Spiritual. He is not something unknowable but something eminently experienceable. He is inexpressible in words, for “from him all speech turns away”, but he is the cause of speech. He is a patent wonder not an unknowable. “Religion is lost if it sinks into the morass of the unknowable infinite in which it can have no foothold,” as a Philosopher says, and Rāmānuja being essentially a religious man, finds that in the last resort, the creed that condemns man eternally to a limitation of knowledge is false. His Brāhmaṇ is eminently knowable, lovable, and reciprocative.

“He is the inward ruler of all-the antaryamin”.

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34 cf. Rāmānuja ’s Conception of Jiva as a Prakara of Īśvara . Prof. P.N.krīṇivasa Charya.