CHAPTER IV

THE COGNITIVE RELATION

I

Cognition--a Relation

We have seen how perception has marks of difference within the presented content itself and that no amount of effort to reduce these differences in the presented can avail except to reduce the reality of the presented. In which case all perception will be vitiated so thoroughly as to be incapable in any manner of granting the real or even suggesting the real as substanding these presentations. The effort to drag in the disparity in the activities of the mind in the presented and the presented itself, or in other words between intellect and sensation so as to reverse the usual views that intellect is a better and truer instrument of knowledge than sense, is an effort that is fraught with consequences of self-contradiction and skepticism.

The consideration or the cognitive relation is what we shall find to be most important. That cognition is a relation at all may be contested. But we shall show that cognition is "product of a particular kind of relation between the subject's consciousness and the object presented to it. This problem is truly modern one; and few thinkers had missed troubling themselves with metaphysics without at the same time being confronted with this. Cognition is the fact of subject-object relation. We find that these three terms go together. The two,
subject and object, are entities, whereas consciousness is the function of the subject in relation with the object. Thus the cognitive relation does not imply merely a static type of status but a dynamic status of the subject.

Śāmkhya accepted a kind of representationalism, since it made the world material *and* the Puruṣa or self a passive spectator-conscious, and the act of perception receptive dynamic, receptive in respect of Puruṣa, because of impressions and tendencies, and dynamic in relation to objects. It had dynamic receptiveness also in its pure state. But how could interaction occur between the inactive self which possesses (or is) consciousness and the active matter which is unconscious? This is the most important point of criticism against the Śāmkhya theory from the epistemological side. The explanation of catalytic action is valuable and most probably explains the eternal persistence of the consciousness as such whilst it is in conjunction with matter. Even then the eschatological problem of release confronts the whole theory. If the self is active it would be involved in matter and release would be impossible. Connection with matter is therefore bondness. This is the cause of all misery. If the self be mere consciousness without volitional and emotional characteristics then the suffering endured or unendurable is a characteristic product that cannot ever touch the self or consciousness. All these criticisms show that the theory has some fatal faults despite its excellent analytic discrimination and realism about the causes of ignorance and sorrow.
Representationalism is a theory of knowledge advanced by those who hold that there is impossibility of real contact between matter that is extended and mind that is unextended, or between the unintelligent and the intelligent. There happens thus a real difficulty regarding how we ever know the outer objects. Our imaginations and dreams show that they are of the stuff of experience. That knowing is a process happening within the consciousness of a self is an admitted fact. The facts of recollection and recognition lend credence to the view that what we perceive are the representations or mental copies registered within our consciousness or mind rather than the objects themselves. Objects are inferred to exist outside the consciousness on the basis of their independence to our wishes and the persistence and vividness of the copies derived from them than in the case of images in recollections and imagination. Thus truth is possible when there is correspondence perceived between the psychical (or material?) copies and the Original things themselves outside the body.

If the representationalistic theory of absolute difference be upheld between matter and spirit and their relation has to be incompatible in any direct manner, there can only be the
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reflection in consciousness of matter, or in the alternative of Sāmkhya, of consciousness in matter. If not there could be a third alternative all that the mind is capable of having imprints of matter in itself and even from a distance like the photo plate. The theories we have discussed are all of the representationalistic school, and are represented by Sāmkhya and the Sautrāntika-buddhistic school. Whilst the representationalism of Sautrāntika is true to type with Des cartes and Locke, the Sāmkhyan theory is peculiar. In Sāmkhya prakṛti or matter reflects the self and the buddhi which is said to occupy the status of mind or consciousness-function in relation to the self, behaves as the medium for the spirit to perceive the things of the world. Buddhi is of tenuous stuff, imperceptible to the eye though material in constitution. The stuff of representations or reflections is thus undoubtedly material though tenuous and imperceptible to the eye, and thus mediates between the perceptible matter and the imperceptible and conscious self. The images thus are not psychical stuff as in representationalism a la type. This feature does not make this doctrine any more acceptable than the other as this does not make buddhi any more perceptible than the rest to the self. If the spirit or mind or self is absolutely inactive and matter absolute active, if the spiritit or mind or self is absolute consciousness and matter absolutely an 'other contact between the two is impossible and inconceivable. Either we accept the fact of their compresence and get along with this as basis, or else we have to find a meeting-ground or a solution that will make this comprescence possible. In the case of Sāmkhya it is matter that mirrors and it is matter that cognizes, wills and experiences, and knowledge becomes a feature of matter in its subtle from as buddhi, Knowledge thus
having been relegated to the side of matter, there is no need for spirit, though Sāmkhya finds reasons for its existence on the basis of the purpose betrayed in the movements of the world.

Knowledge or consciousness in Sāmkhya then will not be different from its place in Cārvāka. In the other case (Cartesian and Sautrāntikan), the entire activity of reception and imprinting belongs to mind, which is said to be a tabula rasa or momentary series, capable of receiving sense-impressions from matter and getting imprinted. The contact between the self and matter is through the medium of representation a tertium quid which is of psychical stuff. But here also the spirit or mind is a passive recipient of impressions from matter. All falsifications of these impressions must be referred to the emotional and instinctive forces operating at all moments of an embodied creature’s life.

The importance here lies in the necessity for an extra-mental reality or external reality without which there can be no representations at all, but which however, could never be known to exist. As Berkeley proved there is no necessity to admit any external reality since the mind can of itself create its images, and secondly, since the objects said to exist outside can never be known or perceived at all as to how they are. All sensations are of the same worth and value and, therefore, it is impossible to admit an external reality other than what we perceive. And what we perceive are images and ideas. In which case matter is an appendage that could be dispensed with. The subjectivistic onslaught of Berkeley was followed up by Hume who shewed that the images and ideas are the
ultimate reals, and there is no subject that we come across, to whom we could refer these imaginings and ideas. The doctrine of Representationalism thus, whether Eastern or Western, suffers from the defeat of making the outer objects inferred in the sense of their being causes. If in addition to this, the doctrine of momentariness of impressions and things and conscious-states is accented as in Sautrāntika buddhistic school, then, it follows that the proof or evidence for their existence is well nigh impossible. Non existence alone is the *terminus quid* of Buddhist representationalism. The history of Representationalism is identical everywhere. It fails to explain the cognitive relation.

The doctrine of compresence is important, indeed all important, in this connection. The subject knows because of compresence with another object: it knows of its own knowing, and it knows that it is knowing, and it knows an object in the act of knowing. These facts belong to the order of experience as every one knows. Unless there are adequate reasons to mark a departure from the ordinary explanation, to deny any one of these factors is to invite criticism. A priori reasons are not as such true. Nor is it found in most cases of inference or rationality that is divorced from experience.

Śankara upholding the absolute difference and opposition between matter and mind and finding that it leads to the impossibility of any kind of representationalism of Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika, concluded like the Yogācāris that the self itself can manufacture its own images which may be celled māyā. The only difficulty of the Buddhist thought that it surmounts and refutes is that it denies the dynamic of the
momentary consciousness-stream and installs a permanent self. The nihilistic appeal of Nāgārjuna was alluring undoubtedly, but it was a haven in which all cows were black and it meant also the surrender of the one omnipotent assurance of the experience of God which he knew and bore witness to. The eristic dialectic of Nāgārjuna, which finds its parallel in the West in Zeno, discovered the antimonics underlying most hypothesis about reality and declared that since all were infected with self contradiction, the nihilistic and the skeptical conclusions were inescapable. Śankara availed himself of all the battery of dialectic of the Buddhistic thought and utilized it to save the Self that transcends all change and movement and dialectic. The result was something similar to Kant’s philosophy but more vital and self-revealing. He built up his system of Advaita or the Non-dual reality on the experience of the Ātman or Atta. This ātman is the magnus or Brahman not the individual egoistic soul formed out of samskāra and vāsana. Buddhistic psychology and sāmkhya psychology had helped the discovery, comprising of the fourfold nature of ego, buddhi, ahamkāra, citta and manas. This ego is the unreal reflection of the Infinite Self and parades as the jīva or individual soul. It may be construed as forming screens of increasing density that hide the self from itself. The rehabilitation of metaphysics was made possible only on the basis of this acceptance. Śankara was too much of a realist to accept the conclusions of Yogācāra which upheld a fictitious store-house of consciousness, ālaya-vijñana, which is nearer the concept of ahamkāra or antaḥkaraṇa than the Self which is the unchanging permanent. In other words, Śankara refuted idealism vigorously when such idealism was not indistinguishable from Solipsism, but he was an idealist all the
same in so far as he made reality consist absolutely only of the
spirit. It entailed the phenomenalizing of all ordinary experience
of the senses; and the cognitive relation itself in so far as it
betrayed the three entities at once was a phenomenal
experience and could never be the truth about reality.

We cannot help discovering here, unfortunate, though it
is, that just as Kant was influenced both by Hume and the
rationalists who of course he refuted with all vigour, Śankara
was influenced considerably by the Buddhistic free-thinkers.
Kantian influence was idealistic though Kant himself gave a
refutation of it; Śankara was an idealist, though he refuted
Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāra doctrines. Kant’s main
contention was that we do not know reality as it in itself
through pure reason, though in fact we are aware of it through
practice and aesthetic reason. In Kant the Noumenon neednot
be merely one, it may contain the many, though this is a
travesty of his own thesis that oneness and manyness cannot
be applied transcendentally. The Practical Reason vouchsafed
for him the manyness of selves. Not so in Śankara’s doctrine.
The religious institutions of Upaniṣads according to him
declare the Oneness or Single nature of the
Noumenon.(pāramārthika- Satta). For him absolute identity is
the truth, the difference and manyness are false. This falsity is
due to Māyā, a ratiocinating, emotional, instinctive factor
whose nature is describable neither as real nor as unreal,-
anirvacanīya.

Śankara’s Māyā is an illusory principle understood
firstly, as sensory, secondly, as ignorance of true nature
(rational), and thirdly as activity (or will). As sensory, it is the
world of experience through the body of objects; as ignorance it is the world of selves which seek to attain reality of being but actually identify themselves with their bodies and desires; as activity, it is the Īśvara, the governer and destiner of the world of objects and selves. It creates the vyavahārika, phenomenal world.

III

Degrees of Reality not Valid

We will now consider whether in such a theory of reality there are available degrees of reality. It is usually contended that the dream states are less real than the waking states, that the state of dream is purely individual and imaginary and that it is caused by instinctive fears, and wishes of the individual. The waking state of consciousness is said to be less real than the direct intuitive. But from the stand-point of the direct intuitive, aparokṣa insight consciousness, all the waking and dream and sleep states are absolutely unreal. There are degrees so to speak in the phenomenal and not the real. Nor is this view helped by the conflicting views sometimes mentioned that the dream-state in a higher state of the self than the waking, because of the independence from objects and objectivity that it entails. This latter is the solipsist view. Absolutely speaking, all are absolutely unreal. The doctrine of degrees of reality is a question that obtains in the phenomenal universe and not in the transcendental. There then happens another type of reality that is in sooth unreality, within which there are degrees. But the fact of unreality as such cognized in regard to the whole universe must be forgotten in that context. If we abandon then
this transcendental, then what remains is the phenomenal, the only universe we know, and the criterion of truth would be non-self-contradiction; and, if another be needed, as indeed it will be, coherence with conduct. The phenomenal will reveal layers of veiling rather than degrees of reality. This solution does not solve the problem of the cognitive. The concept of Māyā brought in to dissolve the cognitive relation is futile in fact, as it is ineffectual in metaphysics and experience. The two-kind theory of Māyā, one universal and a priori, and the other, individual and posteriori, the first leading to a transcendental conversion or veiling, the second to the individual illusions of sense, recalls firmly the two stages of a priori synthesis of Kant also, one of Sense and the other of Understanding.

Illusions are of the sense, and could never happen to the illimitable intelligence. The simile of crystal and red flower posits and does not avoid it, duality at the very start. Metaphors too entail the reality of the terms in some manner. Comparisons taken from experience may carefully be applied in transcendental explanations. The Spirit may have imaginations and creative power, and Vedānta does postulate this in the śūtras, jjanmādyasya yataḥ and jagad-vyāpāra, but it has no illusions. Illusion is the quality of the sense-experience impregnated by hasty generalization. It is different from hallucination which is creative imagination forced outside the individual by some persistent psychic demand. Thus Māyā has no locus, āśraya, in Brahman. The Māyā principle that triochotomizes the unique one, is a fictional principle itself incapable of being an explanation of itself. It was on the ground that it is an unwarranted principle that Rāmānuja
refutes it. There are neither one veil nor two veils nor three nor an infinite number. What is true is that the power of Brahman in so far as it is not apprehended as power of creation, is not understood, so to speak, as the Upaniṣad instructs us to perceive it. It is a phenomenon that baffles understanding. Once the wondrous nature of Brahman Himself is understood Māyā His power of creation or Līlā becomes easily understandable. It is undoubtedly a curtain, yavanikā, but, not unreal.

IV

*Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view criticized*

When we turn to the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, we find that they accept the mere connection between the self and its objects. In other words, they accept the cognitive relation. The objects are known in the presence of the contact between the sense organs and the objects. A sensation is due to the rays of light in the eye passing to the object. It does not explain how we ever can resolve the problem of opposition in the constitution of the two terms, mind and matter as atoms. Representationalism, cannot avail here too. Direct apprehension does explain, but what it can explain is next to nothing but the fact of occurrence of perception. The failure to put the question on the part of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a serious fault in that system. It is the ordinary unreflective man’s philosophy so to speak; or it is due to the perception of the very serious faults arising from any acceptance of representationalism. Once representationalism is in some manner accepted, there is no way out of the nihilistic
conclusion via subjectivism. And yet that does not save Nyāya from being not sufficiently an anvikṣiki. The purely objectivistic and external observational manner of the materialist did not avail itself of this serious problem in epistemology. It is a purely descriptive philosophy and comprises a net-work of only two kinds of relations, the external and the permanent. It is a philosophy of discrete data, somehow seeking to find integrality that it refused to realize or recognize. The cul de sac of Nyāya logic is sceptism again since absolute difference between atoms and souls cannot permit any adequate relation. The explanation of cognition that it is the act of grasping of the object by enveloping it with consciousness as quality, is that of Advaita, and that can at least explain how representations happen or copies reproduced. But mere conjunction at one point can never lead to the experience of the object as an object, nor can it ever lead to the reconstruction of all objects in memory. Nyāya doctrine clean forgot so to speak, the problem of memory. Nyāya's protest against internal relations led to the sacrifice of all explanations of the cognitive relation.

The problem of cognition can be solved only by the acceptance of the psychological fact or the relation of mind and matter as represented in the embodied human being, far from thence we can to infer the possibility of cognition. It is true that many criticisms are leveled against psychology as a science. The cognitive relation is a real relation, fundamental to knowledge and available wherever there is consciousness; and as such is fundamental to any theory of knowledge. Disembodied beings, if they exist, might have a way of knowing, about which we can have no idea, but knowledge is a feature of consciousness which is invariably available
wherever there is subject, The cognitive relation cannot be had in a vacuum without a subject and an object. It comprises three terms, and the cognitive relation itself is a phenomenon that is temporal, that is to say, it can occur with respect of many objects in succession or contiguity. It does not assume the permanent presentation of any one object or compresence or connection with any one object, since that is not its nature, but it reveals itself as related to a permanent subject to whom consciousness as effecting the cognitive relation is an inseparable adjunct.

All idealisms end in systems of Experience. In any case they do not permit the real existence of time, space, nature and objects, though they are prepared to affirm their phenomenal appearance character. Realisms end in systems of relations and all of them finally seek to dissolve all objects into relations, or else they end in atomistic views in respect of every field of experience. An organic theory alone takes into consideration both these and affirms the unity and diversity character of these terms in cognitive relational experience.

V

Nature of relation

The very nature of knowledge presupposes the independent existence of the reality known, and to show that means that idealism is a variety of the subjective point of view. The failure of the thinkers of the idealist and the critical school of Kant is the failure to realize "(1) the directness of the relation between the knower and the reality known, and (2)
impossibility of transferring what belongs to one side of the relation to the other\textsuperscript{1}. This is an admirable exposition of the realistic position and this refutes all assertions that it is "possible for the characteristic of a thing to belong to it as perceived though nor in itself"\textsuperscript{2}. To quote from the same author, Prof. Prichard, "Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence. It is simply impossible to think that any reality depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any knowledge of it. If there is no knowledge there must first be something to be known. In other words knowledge is essentially discovery or the finding of what already is. If a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of some activity or process on the part of mind, that activity or process would not be knowing. but making or creating, and to make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually exclusive". The real difficulty of the Buddhist idealism and their corresponding thinkers in the West, Berkeley and even Kant, was that they ignored consideration of the world as a reality simply and appealed exclusively to its special character as a thing known. The misinterpretation of the psychology of consciousness as such and the cognitive relation made it impossible for them to discover the essential directness and partialness of the cognitive relation as such. There are other powers of the mind that do not involve the dealing with objects as existent objects.

\textsuperscript{1} Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: H.A.Prichard, P.112
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., P. 114
The analysis of consciousness through dream states involved them in the autonomy of the consciousness as creator, but they did not see that it did not involve this autonomy in the experience or relation that is essentially discovery or knowing, and this is indeed different from the making-characteristic or kalpanā and is in fact its negation. There is danger and undoubtedly a serious defect if imagination should play the role of the perceiver. Such a function would be trespassing into knowing. Rāmānuja and the realists clearly admitted the capacity of the mind to delude itself because of its private wishes and desires and imaginations. But they found it to be different indeed in every respect from the knowing process, which in the words of Prof Prichard involves the discovery of what already is. This is the real, and always real. The content of dream states also is also real on the principle that they are engendered in the individual dream state by the Divine Lord according to the moral deserts of each individual, because even there the cognitive relation is normal and not interfered with by the emotions and desires of the individual himself. They are not his kalpanā, but God’s.

The mentalistic theory of the object owes its force also to the wrong interpretation of the object as similar to self-consciousness. The facts of recognition make this interpretation possible. But as Sri Vedanta Desika argues the self same recognition. pratyabhijña, reveals that the content of the recognition is not anything other than the outer world which is apparently not self-conscious. This; view that to be an object is to be inconscient was manifestly at the back of the
Though some objects are inconscient and some others are not and need not be, and indeed even self-conscious brings can become objects of consciousness of some one else, the fact remains that there is the clear understanding of the position that the object of knowledge is other than and is not self-consciousness. This is directly contradictory to the view maintained that the object of consciousness, in the very initial stage of perception is *cit*, consciousness alone.

The doctrine that the object’s existence depends on its being known, *esse est percipi*, makes the cognitive relation the condition of existence. "The relation is one fact which has two sides which are separable and are not inseparable." The subject is always the subject of an object and equally an object is always the object of a subject, but the fact is that the subject and the object need not be subject and object all the time. The subject may continue to perceive or may not and the object may or may not continue to be perceived. The relation is terminable, and further the same object may not continue to be the object of a particular subject and it may vary its subjects *ad infinitum*. Likewise the subject may wander from object to object in a, continuous effort of cognition. But it may equally desist from this perpetual effort. Action demands the cognition: the cognition is purposive therefore, and cessation from action may involve the cessation from the cognitive activity of knowing.

The fact is, relations are of two kinds, terminable or separable, and inseparable. The one is the relation between universals and particulars, substance and qualities, genus and
species. The very elements of the relation dissolve when the relation disappears. "The very being of the elements related involves the relation and apart from the relation disappears. This is the aprathaksiddha-relation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, and this is in one sense an eternal relation. On the other hand the relation of object and subject 'of knowing is essentially temporal.' The elements exist independently of the relation. In other an words, the aprathaksiddha-relation is internal relation, the cognitive relation is an external relation. The relation does bring about knowledge of the one to the other and is serviceable. But it does not involve the very being of the elements that it relates. Relations are non-regressive: therefore the Cognitive relation also is non-regressive.

The theories of representationalism and subjectivism suffer from a fundamental defect. They are worried about the nature of relation itself. How could relations relate? How could they relate distinctly different entities such as a mental subject and a material object?

The first question raises a point that is not worth perhaps serious consideration. The fart is that there is the relation, and to ask for a further elucidation of the positor, is to land oneself and not the relation of the relata, in a fruitless task. Relations relate because they are relations and they cannot be either the terms they relate, nor do they require any other relation to relate them and so on ad infinitum. To say that the relation requires another relation to relate it, is to treat a

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¹ Kant’s Theory of Knowledge : H.A.Prichard p.132
relation as if it were an object-term or relatum, which it is not. To conclude on the basis of this wrong analysis - a hyper critical analysis- that all relations are illusion and that they are not available in the real, is to contradict the very possibility of knowledge. This extreme view had been held by several thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Śankara, and in the west by the Absolute idealists among whom Bradley was the master-mind.

Rāmānuja finds that the cognitive relation is like any other relation: it is external, conjunctive and direct. There is nothing repugnant in a mind knowing its material object, and the doctrine of homogeneity between the subject and object is a false one and no tertium quid is needed to mediate between the mental and the material, in the form of a quasi-mental image or representation, leaving the subject to infer the material object outside. The important part of the whole position is that because the image is sensory it should be a part of the mind, and as such is different from the object outside but in so far as it is outside also, in the sense that it is seen as characterizing the object it is in some manner, of it. The Sāmkhyayan position in regard to the cognitive-relation ,, similar to this and it was more alive to the issue of the homogeneity of the subject and object and made the mind (buddhi) a material, tenuous and reflecting medium, so as to be the locus of the representations. The theory of homogeneity

Is a device brought in to get rid of the theory of direct Perception and ultimately to deny the reality of perception itself. There is indeed enough difficulty in the doctrine of representationalist cognition without any need to take recourse to the theory of homogeneity.
The embodied being is a unity, a psycho-physical unity, and in so far as this is fundamentally real and actual the theory of homogeneity is useless; and no recourse need be had to the theory of parallelism such as that held by Spinoza. The problem of direct perception or knowledge of processes is only postponed and not solved by this theory of autonomous dualism-cum parallelism.

The cognitive relation thus gives rise to the following considerations:

1. It is a relation that is established between a spiritual subject and an object that might be Other than itself.

2. The experience of the outer world is a direct transaction between the sense-organs and the outer world, needing no tertium quid, such as images or representations. Ideas are mental; not so images which have objective loci.

3. The transaction itself is an activity of the self which senses perceive or intuit.

4. The sense impressions are parts of the outer reality which is a continuum characterised by space and time.

5. Space and time are perceived as much as sense-impressions are perceived by the mind which is the sensorium in this case and directly. These reveal that the conjunction of extra-sensory and the sensory in the perceived context is due to the activity of the embodied being simultaneously in both of its aspects.
(6) All that is perceived in perception is real.

VI

Criterion of Falsity

The difference between the perception and the intention of a sense-datum and the sense-datum itself consists in the essential interpretation that is laid upon the sense-datum. The illusions of sense data are not unreal. They are sensed in the manner in which they are given, and there is much truth in saying that normal senses do not lie as even Kant held. The conflict comes in perceptions which are made to stand for objects in the external world and the objects sensed that is, in their interpretation. It is undoubtedly true to say that it is just possible that we do not apprehend all that are in the external universe and that the nature of objects is such that they cannot be fully known. It is perhaps also correct to think that because we do not perceive the minutest atoms in their isolation but only perceive them in their constellations or groupings, the atoms are not capable of being inferred to have any of the forms that we endow them with in their groupings.¹ That however need not deter us from thinking that this percievabiliy or the objective nature or even the possession of these qualities are not in the objects themselves, even as space and time are objective perceptions and cannot be said

¹ Sri Vedanta Desika on the Buddhist Schools of Thought (Paramata Bhanga). Trans by Author. Annals of S.V.O.I. Vol 1. 1940
to be mental. The fatal objection to the mental theory of space or time lies in its inability even to grant the necessity to geometry and other so-called sciences, which depend on the acceptance of space as the property of objects as such and not as perceived by us only. Those who make space merely that which lies between any two visible objects and merely a non-existence (that is a mental construction) cannot make this non-existence fall into any category of non-existence. It is a definite perception and not a, non-existence of either free space or non-existence merely. As non-existence is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhāva would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something tuccha or nirupākhyā)

Falsity is that which pertains to the value of a judgment we pass with regard to an occurrence, what interpretation we place on the datum given, rather than to the existence of the datum itself. This datum cannot he dismissed as an illusion. It exists, and is so far as it is, real. We have to find out only as to where and in what context we shall have to place that event, discover the causes of its occurrence and discover also the intent that had the power to lead us astray. Its truth consists in what position or place it gets within the order of physical events not as to its existence, for that it is absolutely in its own right. Every fact faces the criterion whether it is a fact amongst other facts in a given context or otherwise, and secondly what

it is within itself. Thus the criterion of reality of any sense datum with objective reality of other events which is said to go along with this. The collocation or causes of diverse kinds leads to the production of this sensation and thus the causal theory of perception has in some sense to be assumed. Thus comparison is possible. Secondly, how far there are factors which are introduced by the subject himself into the object observed. Truth can only be distinguished from falsity if there are marks by means of which the knowing subject can tell which elements proceed from the object and which are introduced by himself, the conscious subject. That this can be done also is actually seen. The part that we can within the perception itself discover the causes of illusion and also within the perception itself discover, with the help of the intent, misleading affinities are sufficient to reject the theory of general falsity and indeed can justifiably explain on the basis of common sense realism all illusions of the perceptive kind.

We find that our knowledge of objects is a direct process, not an effect on the sense-order as such but really capable of declaring the nature of the perceptual field, whether it is one’s own body or any other outside our body. This possibility leads to the view that the objects of the physical world are capable of being known independently and directly. The physical objects since they do not enter into us, form an objective continuum available to all the sense-data are, on the other hand, individual, and capable of becoming defective due to the defects in the sense-organs. We may, in fact, speak of the sense-data as merely appearances of real objects or physical objects, and in perception we are aware of both, and not only one of them as in the representationalist view. And
both sense-data and the physical objects are physical and reveal real events and are not merely psychical in any sense of the term.

In Rāmānuja's theory the criterion of truth is placed more upon relation between the intent and the object perceived. And this reference to an object which has value and certain determined consequences as an object amongst other physical objects alone makes the experience true or false. In any ease, being a real event it needs some explanation. Rāmānuja considers that illusions are crucial to the doctrine of perception and a real theory of knowledge. The cognitive relation is real and the contents of the cognitive relation are also real. Consciousness, if it does not know the objects directly, can know nothing at all. That it is embodied does not make it any the less capable knowing through its windows so to speak. The objects cognized are cognized as physical objects and not as mental and it requires an extraordinary theory of projection to substantiate the theory of mental stuff. The refutation of idealism depends upon the refutation not only of the subjective nature of all ideas and impressions through the objective independence granted to them by Bosanquet and other objective idealists, but also by the refutation of the view that spirit is the object also. Matter and spirit or both can be objects. Objects of perception are material. The objects of supersensuous perception may be psychical or matter or God, This is fundamental to the understanding of the; cognitive relation.

Rāmānuja's theory of truth and knowledge relies more upon the organic and common sense position than on any
other system of thought. The distinction between appearance and reality is the most important factor in any theory of knowledge. According to common sense it means that the real is that which recommends itself plainly, 'it is that which contains the others.' The real things or coexistent things are those which could be encountered again, since "this property of being able to present the same thing twice seems to be an ultimate (however mysterious) characteristic of the world with which we have to do.' The reality of the hallucination consists in its being perceived only by the individual afflicted by it more than once. The unreality of its content lies in its failing to satisfy certain canons of acceptance, or, if we prefer the use of the words its reference or intention. Rāmānuja dealing with the reality- of the illusion of shell-silver (or snake-rope) affirms that its content has not only within it the form that is identical in some sense in both but also the specific quality of likeness in matter or the substance itself. Rāmānuja relies for this on the upaniṣadic view that there in quintuple intermixture of all pure elements in such proportions as to produce secondary elements which have one particular element in predominance whilst the rest are subsumed under its influence. This is the famous pāñcikaraṇa prakṛtiya, which is later than the trivṛt karaṇa of the earlier upaniṣads,

Another view is that since reality is only the container of all appearances which must he taken not only in the sense of perspectives but also from the point of view of individual differences, it is a substance with co-existing parts, each of which might be sensed apart, and as such a thing might 'look' as something and yet be not an appearance merely. It should not be forgotten that the real is not an aggregate however of
all these parts or perspective looks. We consider a cube as having all its three dimensions as equal and yet it looks otherwise from other angles of vision. We know the cube to be a thing of a particular nature, and this knowing is a savikalpaka product and the sensations might be and indeed are otherwise

The thing appears in a particular form to sense or rather in sensation and it is not a fragment of the object at all. The inference as to the nature of the thing as in itself it a real inference based on the whole series of observations and disinterested discriminations made of it. The perception of silver in shell and snake in rope are merely instances of fragmentary appearances which are not unreal, but on the other hand fully real and articulate in the real thing. They however claim to be the whole thing. In other words we thus seem to emerge with the result however we may feel baulked by the problems of hallucinations, illusions and error, that the real is not a few selected appearances only, that everything that appears at all is real. 90 far as the foregoing considerations reach, the IēeBl means all that is and what is, includes all that it seems to be. In a word, all appearance that ever are are real. ¹ In Rāmānuja's own words 'What in is real'--sarvam vijñanajātam yathārtham².

² Śrī Bhāṣya : I.i.1.cf.
   Yathārtham Sarvavijñanam iti Vedvidām matam I
   Śruti-smṛtibhyas sarvasya sarvātmatva praṭītaḥ II
In this context it is necessary to bear in mind the important distinction that was made by Śankara regarding the phenomenal reality and error within the phenomenal, prātibhāṣika, and the transcendental which was beyond all reach of thought, understanding, and sense being a supersensuous experience. He begins, even like Kant, to speak about the distinction 'between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two points of view. He ends with a distinction between two different realities, things in themselves external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena or appearance within it.

This distinction is fatal to all real theories of error and no ultimate distinction can to be made between appearance and reality at all. If we do not admit the possibility of any apprehension of reality with our consciousness or thought, there is no possibility of apprehension of error either as against the real. The fact is that illusions are caused by the fact of their being understood to be otherwise than what they appear at any moment in a particular context or condition, and yet the real is considered to be a fact of thought and the illusion as the actual apprehension of the senses.

then follow 13 verses explaining the theory of Trivṛṭkaraṇa of the vedic view.

nā mithyārtha-satyartha viṣayatva nibhandanaḥ
Evam sarvasya sarvatra vyavahāra vyavasthitih
Further as Prof. Prichard says, Just as it is absurd to describe the fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that while the stick is not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an appearance being necessarily mental cannot possibly be said to be extended. The more important defect of any doctrine that reduces all perception and perceived objects to the level of appearances lies in the fact that they tend to equate the thing as appealing into mere appearances, a defect that lays bare the fundamental difference between the two. The first shows that the ‘intent’ is the pointer of the sensation to the object external to the subject, whereas the other reduces this intent to nothing and makes a first-class blunder in the analysis of cognition. It is a fundamentally wrong transition in thought.

It is fundamental to all theories knowledge that the distinction between truth and falsity should be clear and unambiguous and should not be capable of being reduced to degrees of reality on the basis of the actual fact of degrees of knowledge. Knowledge that is arrived at through thought, jñāna, and that which we get through sensation are both real. Abolish this parity then we find ourselves in the quandry of illusionism that thought itself is a deluding and illuding

1 On the whole theory of this fallacious transitions in thought reference should be made to Prichard’s Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, which is a masterly analysis. Śankara and all other types of idealism commit similar mistakes. Chapters on Space and Phenomena and things-in-themselves are the most important, pp.36-102
instrument. It is true that consciousness has sensory and thinking functions as also of enjoyment of objects. But it is thought or thinking that makes us *think a thing as it is*, not sensation. "For it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in themselves what we think them to be: and from the nature of the case a presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but cannot be questioned at all." It is this same point that is constantly emphasized by Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and other realistic schools. Once deny thought the power of apprehension of the real and make it a delusive instrument and a creator of illusion or mere imagination, *vikalpa*, then the road is there clear for complete annihilation of all metaphysics and epistemology. To convert the power by which release is to be attained, jñāna into a power of delusive imagination, is to give up all chances of liberation of consciousness.

The paradox of the whole situation is that in seeking to extend the frontiers of understanding and knowledge, the effort actually made led to surrender of its potency and existence.

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1 There is no right for the nihilist to take part in argumentation since there is no means by which he could. He who has himself known that are chimerical, if he does not perform activities with reference to perceived objects he has no need to refute the activities of those who seek heaven and liberation. Since even the delusion that all are unreal is itself chimerical there is no need to get over it.

"To one who affirms that *vikalpa* is not the source of right knowledge, there is no way of accepting the indeterminate knowledge, which in itself determined to exists by determinative cognition alone". Śrī Venkaṭanātha in *Paramata-bharga*, Ch.XI (Annals S.V.O.I. Vol 1)
No wonder the Doctrine of Reason, and Doctrine of the Super-
experience abandoned the one principle of reality on which
they based their dialectical opposition.

VIII

Reality of all Cognitive Content

Every cognition is of a real thing. The cognitive act is
real, and the subject of cognition is also real. The three terms
are real and therefore the illusions that occur must be traced to
certain extra-relational conditions. Intra organic defects as well
as the ambiguities in the objects perceived are important in
any understanding of the problem of error and illusion.
Illusions are of the sense level, whilst errors pertain to the level
of inferences or judgment. The failure of thinkers to study the
theory of illusion from the standpoint of the physiological or
embodied spirit has been at the basis of most failures. It is
clearly seen that when the bodily state is otherwise than
normal there have occurred frequently the failures to judge
properly. Indolence and sleepiness are referable mainly to the
bodily state of un-preparedness. That there is not any
physiological process apart from the psychological may be
easily demonstrated. The dream consciousness may be a state
of the mind which is actively operating in the brain inter
organically receiving no stimulus from outside, but on the
whole we find that at least no judgment is possible as to its
rightness or falsity. Indeed we can say considering the physio-
psychic disposition at that period that it is active and real
during the period of its operation. The conscious states
experienced in dreams are not unreal. As Bradley says
There is nothing to prove that the dream world is unreal, though this restricted world of our- must be accepted for all practical purposes. The dream pictures and experiences are real and really experienced. Therefore the mental condition does produce certain impressions which so far as they go do grant real objects. The fact is that the conception of the real here is that which actually occurs as a fact of perception however much it may be private. Privacy of an experience does not make it unreal as such, nor is public experience or experience that is participated in by all, namely outer objects in any better position. All depends on the veracity of the individual, his real experience as a searcher and observer of his bodily process, in so far as they also vibrate or reveal emotional conditions.

The nature of dream also in so far its content is concerned is such that it is not anything other than the images already experienced now projected on the mind's canvass so to speak in such a form as to grant a retrospective emotion.\(^1\) The jaundiced perception is a real perception. The experience of mirage is a real experience of cognition. The perception of continuity of a circle of fire when only a fire brand is rapidly revolved is a real experience. The reflection of the face in a mirror is a real fact of experience. The perception of a double moon is also an actual experience. The seeing of stars when the eyelid is pressed is also as real as anything else. The rope is perceived as a snake, and a snake too appears as a rope. All these and others too can be explained. But the

\(^1\) Cf. Appendix II: *Dreams in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja*:
explanations do not abolish the actual experiences or even the perceptions. The shell looks silver we say, and having known it the shell continues to look like silver. The perception of similar structure and colour is the cause of this illusion here. The shell actually reveals the shining surface of silver. The illusion is a real fact since certain activities follow from the acceptance of the view that it is silver. Emotions are engendered by them. What is wrong in the associative reference which we have made by identifying this experience with the previous experience of silver. Illusion is impossible without prior knowledge. It is a product of wrong association of present experience with the past on the basis of a perceived similarity that approximates to tādātmya, identity. Thus we find that illusion is impossible unless two conditions are fulfilled and these two conditions are both real viz, (1) that there was prior experience and (2) that the present experience has definite similarity of the perceptual kind with the previous experience. Given these two, the illusion is bad.

In the case of the mirage the feature is identical since from a distance a sheet of water looks in a particular manner, like an experience already undergone and since the immediate experience has features which are common to reflection by water, we take it that the content of this experience is the previous experience. Memory thus plays a significant part in illusion. The common quality may be called by any name: in the above instances as silver-ness which is the specific quality or structure form or colour, or water which is a specific quality or structure. The transitiveness of the application depends on the first experience and also on the value of the experience. Silver is more useful than shell, water more than sand. Wherever
therefore this previous judgment had been made there the judgments that are passed in regard to illusory experience are governed by this predeliction.

Our first judgment, then, is 'this is silver', at the initial valuation. But this cognition sublated in meaning or value by a further scrutiny or, is, by the actual confirming conduct such as we adopt in the case of gold, which takes cognition of its other qualities and history. The difference between silver and silvery quality of the shell perceived in the latter becomes manifest. Hence the second judgment This is like silver or This resembles silver and the further judgments This is not silver. I have been deceived into thinking that this is silver.

In all these above cases what make the illusions possible are (i) the hasty generalizations due to the activity of imagination, generalizations based upon the fundamental similarity of structure—a real fact, undisputable and absolute, since the factors that make the illusions possible are not non-resident in things which apparently cause illusion, (ii) or due to the organic defects,; iii) or speed of motion which makes it impossible for the eye to adapt itself to picture': or things moving at a greater speed than it can register, (iv) or ill health or (v) due to the imaginative activities of the individual (vi) or the will of God.

Jaundice is an organic defect.¹ Mirage in due to

¹ Śrī Bhāsya I.i.1. Pīṭaśankhādou tu nananavarti-pittadravya-sambhinnā nāyana-raśma-yaśśankhādibhi-samyujyate/
perceptive illusion,¹ and Rāmānuja’s explanation is that since according to the Upaniṣads everything is in every other thing due to \(\text{pāncīkaraṇā}\), there arises the possibility of illusion of water from the conjunction of light and earth. This may also be due to merit and demerit. The fire-brand swung rapidly looks like a wheel and this is due to the rapidity of motion, so much so the eye could not follow the intervals from one position to another. The reflection of the face in the mirror is due to the fact of rapid movement of light from the face to the mirror and back again and this interval is not perceived by us². We are unable to distinguish between the source of the rays and their backward movement. This is the cause of the illusion. The mistaking of direction is due primarily to the relativity of direction. What is south to one is north to the other. The perception of the double moon is due to unequal adjustment of the two eyes to the common object the moon. The defect in the organic apparatus is the cause of this illusion.

The fundamental principle then that emerges from this is that the actuality of the perception proves that some factors are real and these cannot be sublated by any explanations.

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² Darpaṇādiṣu nijamukhāddipratītirapi yathārthā. Darpaṇādi-pratihatagatapyo hi nāyanaraśmayo darpaṇādidesagrahaṇa - pūrvakam nijamukhādi grhnanti. Tatrāpi atiśaighṛyād antarālāgrahaṇāt tathā pratitiḥ
whatssoever. In this sense all experiences of states of consciousness are real in so far as they have a beginning in real causes which produce actual effects.

Illusions of the perceptive level are such that if they were to be sublated they should no longer be seen. The reality of the entire perception is proved by the fact of persistence of the perception, and this is an important fact. The illusionist who speaks for the unreality of the perceived might say that there is persistence of ignorance even after enlightenment through knowledge. Thus he might say 'The moon is one, and yet the diseased eye sees two moons. With the knowledge that there is but one moon may not the knowledge of the duplicated moon continue to exist? To this we reply: this analogy does not apply to your case. For the disease of the eye is a fact, whereas your disease viz., ignorance which produces the dualistic notion is a figment. Again the cause, viz., the disease of the eye, giving birth to the sight of the 'duplicated moon,' remains: whereas your ignorance has vanished! There is thus reason for the persistence of the double moon though it must be conceded that stronger evidence existing in favour of one moon renders the diseased eye, a proof of little or no importance.¹

¹ Gitā Bhāṣya : Śrī Rāmānuja: ii.12. parama-purṣasyā dhigatā dvaita jñānasya bādhitānuvr̥ṭtirūpam idam bheda jñānānam dagdha paṭādivan na bōdhakam ityucyeta naitadupapadyate maricikājalajñānādikam hi bādhitam amivartamānām najalāharaṇādi pravṛtti hetuḥ̥.. Dvichandrajñānādaudau to cāndraitatva jñānena pāramārthika-timiradoṣasya dvicandrajñānahetorapi naṣṭatvād bādhitānuvr̥ṭtiryuka.
This *bādhitānuvṛitti*, the persistence of the illusory cognition even after knowledge of its illusoriness, is a special feature of the doctrine of Advaita. The traces of the illusion of duality persist after the knowledge of the Identity. This is refuted by Rāmānuja on the ground that it is wrong analysis. The thing is true and its characteristic of similarity, sādriśatva, with any other object is in its very nature. That is the reason for the continuance of its nature after the distinctions have been made. The illusion does not persist it is only the nature of a thing to persist. Knowledge does not sublate the perception: it corrects the false identification of this similarity with the intention of another thing.

Personalistic thought, such as that of Rāmānuja which is also organistic, regards the soul or self as distinct from God and looks upon the world as a vast system of stimuli, which serves as a medium of communication between God and man, and between spirits in general. There is thus an 'ineradicable dualism' which cannot be dismissed by any efforts of idealism. If human thought is identified with absolute thought as in Hegelian Epistemology, it is impossible to explain error. Error must have its counter point in reality as well as in truth if idea equals a thing or object. Error is partial truth if idea equals a thing or object. Error as partial truth cancels error rather than explains it. And "if ignorance and illusion are to be accounted for, there must be a more distinct separation between the human and the divine than absolute idealism permits. The fact of error is the Achilles heel in every monistic epistemology. Thus writes an excellent writer. And we can certainly agree with him in saying that the problem of error is crucial to any theory. A correspondence theory of knowledge certainly is
naive and can only be substantiated if ever we can prove that there are two ways of knowing simultaneously one and the same object. It is this that has to be proved. The only test then will be of verification of the intention implicit in every Object. Not so according to the equally naive theory of monism which dismisses the object by taking it over into itself. There is no criterion of comparison or correspondence, but only of coherence. It is this simplicity and constructiveness of monism that has at once made it so ambitions and futile as an explanation. Thus personalistic thought confronted with the difficulty of affirming that the outer objects are not anything other than mere wave lengths and movements or changes of location or independent continuity of process, is yet capable of turning critical by means of the acceptance of real order of unity in and through the Divine Purpose which is affirmed by mystic experience. It is this mystic knowing that leads to the corrective of the purely empirical or phenomenal. The divorce achieved by the critical kantianism is removed without impairing its contribution to thought and knowledge.

IX

The Twofold Criterion and Falsity

According to the Philosophy of Rāmānuja we have seen that every cognition is of a real thing, that the truth of a sense-datum consists in itself, and that it can be determined only by an attentive analysis of its reference in physical reality by its effects. The considerations which we have brought
forward till now were those of real similarity between two things mistaken for one another, which have identical appearances, that is to say as between the genera that they represent or rather manifest when viewed in a manner that is without any consideration of the intent of reference to actual reality. Secondly, that these sometimes revealed that the sense organs were defective or else were due to certain real instinctive and emotional factors which blurred the distinctions between the factors constituting the perception of the real object. Thus we are forced to consider firstly the value of each sense datum presented on its own merits, and secondly, how far a physical object or sense-datum coheres with the experience of other objects similarly situated and perceived. This leads us to consider the value of each sense-datum, which ought to display or exhibit certain effects in order to be considered real. There are then available two criteria integral to one another that is, the perceptive and the consequential. This two fold criterion indeed makes the object an effective existence and capable of guiding conduct. This is the dynamic element in the doctrine of Knowledge. The philosophy of Rāmānuja is neither the static view nor yet the merely dynamic view illustrated by the radical doctrines of Buddha which culminated in an utterly self-negating Nihilism, and self-refuting conduct. It sees in the real the fulfillment of purpose as well as the fulfillment of knowledge, or rather the fulfillment of knowledge through Purpose and vice versa. Truth accordingly is that which is in accordance with the accepted conduct in regard to a particular object *vyavahārānuguṇa-jñānam pramāṇa*. Vyavahāra for Rāmānuja means nothing other than that which stands for the test of actual use of all or coherency in active life with the knowledge of other things and their utilities.
THE COGNITIVE RELATION

Thus the acceptance of the knowledge about a particular sense-datum would lead to certain initial judgments which would at once force us to carry out certain activities to meet the situation suggested or forced upon us by such a perception, because also of the urgency of the emotional situation. We act then us if the sense-datum is true and because it is a real occurrence. If the consequences of taking it as an objective factor, as a physical object or event, independent of individual sensing or being, do follow, then we consider it to be a real factor or true fact or reality, or else it is no less real but it has to be explained as an event in the physical order. That would mean that these two factors of sense-datum and physical existence which are both given in an identical perception form so to speak a complex relation of body and soul. But any distinction of subjective sense-datum and objective physical continuum both of which are united and form complete knowledge is possible relatively with reference to the activity which is not a subjective affair. But how is this sense-datum as a physical abject in an external continuum capable of fulfilling itself as a real effective entity, that is as an object in the external world of physical objects? Any discrepancy between sense and physical objectivity thus leads to the question of illusion. Thought means coherency, and as between physical objects, causal efficacy or relation or actual power is the important fact about them; thus an embodied being as a denizen of two worlds knows his complex truth or knowledge in a two-fold manner through sensation and conduct: In this connection we may use the analogy of binocular vision. The tridimensional manifold is perceived. The physical property of motion in the objects themselves as different from the movements that we make are also registered
by ocular adjustments of the ciliary muscles. Thus we find that the physical continuum cannot be separated from the sense-datum that we perceived.

Snake ceases to stand for a snake in consciousness as thought, though it continues to be a snake so far as the perception is concerned at first, but on second look it is found that the perception itself undergoes change from snake to a rope and what is residual in that experience betrays that quantum of similarity between the snake and the rope. Thus it seems wrong to hold that the perception stands as such even whilst the object's reference or place in thought has undergone the change into a rope. This feature it is that makes many persons hold the view that illusion is due to non-observation. Even perception, the more it becomes deep and profound and interpenetrative reveals the sources of the illusory perception. What happens in the period is firstly the gradual loss of emotion and other disturbances. In the second period there is more and more analysis of the structure of the content of the perception and this is achieved by a vigorous explorative activity of the mind and involves utter freedom from emotional and memory images. Lastly, when it is found that all the factors have been analysed there is displayed the similarity that was the root of the illusion. This similarity is, the true cause, is real and cannot be annihilated. This similarity is proved negatively and positively. Positively through experiment and negatively, when it is superficial or unessential. Isomorphous substances need not also be isomeristic. Thus though illusions may be due to non-observation akyāti, they are found to be also due to anyathā-khyāti that is inferring them to be otherwise because of previous associations. The
emotion at the first moment is due to strong formal similarity and this is avoided or capable of being got over undoubtedly by more observation. But it is conduct of experimentation that abolishes the illusion.¹ The criterion then of error is that it must be capable of being sublated and we must have the feeling of reasoned certainty because of its persistence in the form it is proved to be on second looks into it. Rāmānuja contends that the snake as Sense-datum was an actual experience which cannot be anything but real, but its falsity or error as a physical existence is due entirely to its not fulfilling the condition of coherency or intention of its nature in relation to other objects and persons.

It is on this point we have to see that the element of time is introduced into this definition of reality. It is certainly not repugnant according to Rāmānuja for a thing to cease to be and yet be real. Dreams are real and yet they cease to be. Things are real and they cease to be. Reality is a characteristic of all things without which they can never be even for a moment. To deny reality is to embrace the void. Rightly therefore Rāmānuja holds that no halfway arrangements or compromises are possible between the Void and the Brahman. Brahman is Existence. It is the central core of all existences and the fact about all creation. All things that appear or come into being and pass out of existence are as much real as any permanent, since they could not well appear without really being what they are. Error consists in treating the appearance as real in a different sense than that it is. It is not explained by

¹ Cf. Appendix on Viśiṣṭadvaitic Theory of Perception.
converting the appearance into an unexplainable mystery or myth or illusion.

Further the important fact remains that illusions are not all of the same type and have to be distinguished. If to distinguish, to analyse, is to create division, is to imagine differences where there are none, as evidenced by the attack on *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, then truth is an impossibility. Now that we find that the way into the open spaces of Intuition is barred to this knowledge of the Undifferentiated, there is no other go except to accept the differences as facts.

The fact is that the physical order is common to all embodied selves, and they themselves form part of it, in so far as they are embodied. That there might be disembodied spirits need not be questioned, as that is irrelevant to the theory of knowledge that we are concerned with here. This objectivity might he brought to prove the validity or otherwise of a sense-datum. But merely because a number of persons say that the double moon is experienced, one cannot jump to the conclusion that there are two moons very close to one another (*samantara*) almost perhaps like double-stars of modern astronomy, and that they are moving round our Planet. Rāmānuja refers to an island inhabited completely by such people (*timiradosa-grastha*). This is likely but it cannot double the moon. When we make this statement there is the awareness within perception itself that there cannot be two moons and that one moon alone is the truth. The defect universal cannot prove a thing true. This makes it imperative that the criterion in such cases must be found to be other than perception itself. Illusions of sense through sense-defects are
adjusted because of the failure in conduct. This factor of adjustment negatively to a defect is a common fact of experience. The criterion of truth stands on the two-fold plank of discrimination and of conduct of verification, of intent suggested vyavahārānga kriyā kārita.

In this context it is apt to quote the views of Professor G. R. Stout in his Gifford Lectures:¹ The bare fact that pink rats seem real to the drunkard is of itself presumptive evidence that they are real. The bare fact that the oar dipped in water looks bent is presumptive evidence that it is in fact bent. But the presumption is liable to be weakened and upset or reinforced and established according as the seeming fact fills its place or refuses to fill its place in a coherent context with other facts for each of which there is independent evidence supplied by other perceptual appearances. Further the coherence required is such as will make possible successful action effective adaptation of means to ends. Why do we believe the oar to be straight although it looks crooked? For such reasons as the following. If I try to grasp it in the water on the assumption that it is really bent I miss my aim. If it is really bent it ought to seem so to touch as well as sight, but it does not. If it was really bent how could one successfully row with it. Again on the assumption that the oar is straight as it seems to be when it is out of water, it would not become bent and unbent merely by being dipped and ceasing to be dipped. And we may add that in case it is said that it might be like the rod of iron that is capable of being bent when in fire

¹ Mind and Matter: G.F. Stout. p.259, 1931
and incapable of being bent when outside it, then we say that bendingness and unbendingness are qualities dependent upon the conditions, and are real. In the case of the oar it is the refraction in water that is the matter about this bent-appearance, in the other case it is change in molecular arrangement in the iron rod brought about by heat in the atoms.

Judgments then must take into consideration the place, the conditions, the time and the nature of the structure available and its similarity and "intent", that is to say, what results must follow if it were the thing perceived.

Thus every event has to satisfy the dual tests, the intrinsic test that pertains to its nature: how far freed from the prejudice of memory and emotional disturbances, there are features of similarity which make their invariable appearance, and the experimental test (wrongly called pragmatic test), how far the object perceived as real is capable of fulfilling the obligations of its physical coherence.

Thus the object is a unity of sense and matter and between the two there is a coherence that is verified by the practical test or value. Knowledge apprehends this unity as such and there is nothing repugnant in an experience being real even when it is also misinterpreted.

X

Reality as content of all Cognition
From our study of illusions which are usually individual and belong to the individual embodied human beings, we shall now turn to the study of the nature of Cognition. Rāmānuja holds that there is nothing inherently wrong with our cognitive processes which should make us apprehend falsity instead of truth. What we know is that there are certain essential limitations of the normal senses. Our knowledge of the world filters into us through our senses. That does not and cannot be said to present unreality. If the world is false there can never arise the knowledge of the true and the real. Nor could we apprehend it. It may with rightness be said that if our senses are purified then we shall perceive really. Jainistic thought held the view that when the karma-matter that has gathered into the soul is slowly heated and expelled from it by tapas, austerity, then the soul becomes capable of real perception that is real. This they call pratyakṣa. Bergson agreeing with Socrates in Phaedo held the view that if there were no sense-organs or the body we shall see all as in direct vision, whole and entire. The fact remains that no one can quarrel with the view that the senses must be purified, and also that vāsanās, tendencies or habits or desires should not corrupt the seeing-mind. For it is the mind that is said to move towards the object and gather it up or shall we say that the light in the eye goes over to the object and gets back again so that the object appeals as erect, and not inverted as some psychologists contend these days. We know the world given to us in experience: making allowance for evil or unpurified thoughts and imaginations and habits or organic defects there is yet sufficient reality in these that cannot he overthrown. Knowing is the function of a real being. Consciousness is therefore a reality-giver. The cognitions that are, are likewise of the
Imagination no doubt creates an ineffectual reality like artistic products and these are mostly untrue since they can never pass into actual effects. Imagination requires some substrate in general. Its manifestations are conditioned by the consciousness that it has. If it be perfect then its creations are of the real; and if on the contrary the consciousness is imperfect or ignorant it may not be able to create at all or if creating, those creations will be not true. The individual as finite is not at fault, it in his creative power of consciousness, iccha-kriyā- sakti that undergoes mutilation and perversion when it is ignorant. Because there is equality between the freed individual and the Supreme Lord in so far as knowledge is concerned, jñāna-sāmya¹, his creations then reveal reality,

¹ There is nothing repugnant in a real soul really creating anything, just as God Himself out of His magnificent will creates all creation. The limit of the finite, however, is the universe itself; total creation is possible only to the universal self of all. Jagadvyāpāra and Janmād yasya yataḥ Sūtras explain this stand point. There is also nothing essentially wrong in considering that the Lord might not have brought out all creation of His infinite Being through Will. Even the Asat of the Infinite means only the Infinite Not-yets of time. And time therefore plays a role in the scheme of creation. Rāmānuja tends to lean towards cretionism, but finds that an inner determination of the Divine Lord and the reality of the individuals and the objective nature make it impossible to reduce these into real creations of the Divine Lord.
The real is apprehended because it is the nature of consciousness to know the real: whilst contraction *sankoca* leads to partial visions, imaginary filling up of the interstices of experiences and reading into things falsify the real.